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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Equal Protection-Disparate Statu-
tory Sentencing Schemes for Males and Females Declared Un-
constitutional. State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78
(1973).
The past decade has been witness to a rapidly mushrooming concern about
the inequitable treatment of women before the law. Even the Supreme
Court has evinced tacit recognition of this fact.' While sex discrimination
seems pervasive throughout our society, the discrimination evidenced by the
differential sentencing of male and female criminal offenders presents a
particularly egregious example.
Disparate sentencing procedures in New Jersey were declared unconstitu-
tionally void in State v. Chambers,2 where female defendants had been
sentenced for indeterminate terms in the Correctional Institution for Women
at Clinton." New Jersey's statutory scheme provided for the sentencing of
1. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
2. 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973). Six cases were consolidated on appeal. All
six female defendants either pleaded guilty or were tried and found guilty of gambling
offenses. One defendant had challenged her sentence by petition for a post-conviction
hearing after which the trial court concluded that the state had failed to justify its
sentencing scheme and ordered the defendant to be resentenced for a minimum-max-
imum term; the state appealed that order. In the other five cases, the defendants
appealed challenging the constitutionality of the sentencing scheme on equal protection
grounds. These six cases were certified for appeal to the New Jersey Supreme Court
while pending unheard in the Superior Court.
3. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-154 (Cur. Supp. 1973) reads in pertinent part:
Any female above the age of sixteen years, convicted of a crime which would
be punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison if she were a male, shall
be committed to the Correctional Institute for Women ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-155 (Cum. Supp. 1973) reads in pertinent part:
The several courts in sentencing to the Correctional Institution for Women
shall not fix or limit the duration of the sentence, except as otherwise pro-
vided for herein, but the time which the prisoner shall serve in the reforma-
tory or on parole shall not exceed 5 years . . . or the maximum term pro-
vided by law for the offense of which the prisoner is convicted and sentenced
if such maximum is less than 5 years; provided, however, that the court,
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women for indeterminate terms and men to minimum-maximum terms
within the statutory maximum for the same offense. The court declared
this scheme an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment 4 insofar as it provided for the disparate sentencing
of female offenders over the age of 30.5
Applying a strict scrutiny test to determine "... whether a fundamental
constitutional right is being impaired," the Chambers court found the state
unable to sustain its burden of substantial justification with any empirical
support that penological goals were furthered by sentencing women differ-
ently than men for the same offense. 7
Historical Analysis
Shortly after the end of the Civil War, a movement to establish separate
prison facilities for women was initiated.8  This movement was coinci-
dental with the development of new theories of penal reform which had
gained general acceptance by the end of the 19th century. Earlier notions
were rejected in favor of the goals of rehabilitation and re-education. 9 Thus
emerged the reformatory concept, and contemporaneously the parole system
and the indeterminate sentence, the purpose of which was to provide suffi-
cient time for the penal institution to perform its rehabilitative function,' °
by keeping the offender confined ". . . as long as his own good or the wel-
fare of the state shall justify his detention. . ... 1" Acting upon precisely
this rationale, the early women's institutions were based upon the reforma-
in its discretion, for good cause shown, may impose a sentence greater than 5
years, but in no case greater than the maximum provided by law, and the
commitment shall specify in every case the maximum of the sentence so im-
posed. The term may be terminated by the board of managers in accordance
with its rules and regulations ....
[hereinafter cited as sentencing statutes].
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. 63 N.J. at 296, 307 A.2d at 82-83. Only women over the age of 30 are neces-
sarily subject to this invidious discrimination since males between the ages of 15 and
30 may be sent to the Men's Reformatory instead of the State Prison pursuant to
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-147 (Cum. Supp. 1973), where indeterminate sentencing is
the rule. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-148 (Cum. Supp. 1973).
6. 63 N.J. at 296, 307 A.2d at 82.
7. Also, women were not eligible for parole under specific statutory standards as
were men; nor were their indeterminate sentences subject to good conduct reductions.
8. The first women's reformatory was opened in Indiana in 1873. L. ROBINSON,
PENOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (1921) [hereinafter cited as ROBINSON]. See
also, F. HAYNES, THE AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTION
STANDARDS 484-86 (1969).
9. See generally T. MOSBY, CAUSES AND CURES OF CRIME 212-75 (1913) [herein-
after cited as MOSBY]; ROBINSON 17-31.
10. See MOSBY 276-334.
11. Id. at 279. Radical reformists would have gone further to suggest that ".
when there is no hope of reformation there should be no hope of liberty." Id.
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tory model and sought to remove women from the debilitating influence of
the penitentiary system. 12  This new reform penology was gradually reflected
in the sentencing practices adopted by various states.
In 1919, the Kansas Supreme Court, in State v. Heitman,13 declared a stat-
ute substantially similar to that in Chambers to be neither arbitrary nor un-
reasonably discriminatory in violation of the equal protection clause. The
opinion of the Kansas court exemplified the type of early 20th century
thinking which virtually insured the results reached through its application
of a "rational basis" test 14 when it stated that there ". . is a feminine type
radically different from the masculine type, which demands special consid-
eration in the study and treatment of nonconformity to law.' 15
Over half a dozen cases'" were decided in the decade following Heitman
involving various forms of statutory sentencing discrimination on the basis
of sex. Most of these concerned situations similar if not identical to Heit-
man and Chambers. The courts upheld these statutory schemes in the face
of equal protection challenges. Continuing a rational basis approach, they
supported the right of the legislature to classify according to sex as neither
arbitrary nor unreasonable in light of the different penal philosophies sup-
porting the reformatory as opposed to the state penitentiary, and the dif-
ferent moral and social problem presented in the rehabilitation of women
offenders as opposed to men.
The few cases to be decided during the next forty years continued to up-
hold the constitutionality of the disparate sentencing schemes on the basis
of the power vested in the legislatures to make reasonable classifications ac-
cording to sex for the purposes of punishment and reformation.
17
12. ROBINsON 32-52. At this time there was a relatively small number of female
offenders, proportionately one female to every nine males. RoBINsoN 85.
13. 105 Kan. 139, 181 P. 630 (1919).
14. Deference is given to legislative classification as long as the classification was
based upon ". . some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the
act in respect to which the classification is proposed ....... Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897).
15. 105 Kan. at 143, 181 P. at 634.
16. Ex parte Dunkerton, 104 Kan. 481, 179 P. 347 (1919); State v. Adams, 106
Kan. 278, 187 P. 667 (1920); Territory v. Armstrong, 28 Hawaii 88 (1924) (males
given 3-12 month sentences while females only 2-4 months, for adultery); Ex parte
Fenwick, 110 Ohio St. 350, 144 N.E. 269 (Ohio 1924); Platt v. Commonwealth, 256
Mass. 539, 152 N.E. 914 (1926); Ex parte Brady, 116 Ohio St. 512, 157 N.E. 69
(1927). See also, Note, Sex Discrimination and the Constitution, 2 STAN. L. REv.
691, 723-24 (1950).
17. State v. Beddow, 32 N.E.2d 34 (Ct. App. Ohio 1939); Ex parte Gosselin, 141
Me. 412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945), appeal dismissed, 328 U.S. 817 (1946). It is interest-
ing to note that the great bulk of litigation in this area occurred in the years surround-
ing the passage of the nineteenth amendment in 1920, and the passage of the proposed
Equal Rights Amendment in 1972.
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The turning point was reached in 1968, when the Connecticut Superior
Court struck down that state's statutory provisions for sentencing women
to an indefinite period with a maximum longer than the statutory maximum
applicable to males. Turning away from the rationale of the earlier cases,
the court found no reasonable basis for such a sexual differentiation.' 8
Following this decision came three others, 19 all of which declared uncon-
stitutional similar statutory sentencing provisions. The first of these, United
States ex rel. Robinson v. York,20 criticized the simplistic view that the sole
purpose of sentencing was rehabilitative. While the early courts were too
caught up in their ideological and moralistic theories regarding women and
the reformatory experience to appreciate objectively the patent inequities of
longer incarceration based on sex (placing the burden upon the challenger to
demonstrate that such classification was arbitrary and unreasonable 2 '), the
modem courts were not so handicapped. Comparing sex classifications to
those based upon race, the court in Robinson suggested for the first time the
use of a "strict scrutiny" test,22 and found that ". . . the state has failed to
carry its burden in support of the proposition that a greater period of im-
prisonment is necessary for the deterrence of women than men."' 28
It was in this judicial climate that State v. Costello,2 4 the forerunner of
Chambers involving the same sentencing scheme, was decided. Finding the
statutes to constitute treatment of a class which impinged ". . . seriously
on fundamental personal interests," 25 the New Jersey Supreme Court uti-
lized a strict scrutiny standard and remanded the case for an adversary
hearing to allow the state to present its substantial justifications. 26
During the time between the Costello and Chambers decisions, however,
the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Frontiero v. Richardson2T
wherein four members of the majority agreed:
18. Liberti v. York, 28 Conn. Sup. 9, 246 A.2d 106 (Super. Ct. 1968).
19. United States ex rel. Robinson v. York, 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968); Com-
monwealth v. Daniels, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968), noted in 82 HARV. L. REv.
921 (1969); United States ex rel. Sumrell v. York, 288 F. Supp. 955 (D. Conn. 1968).
But see Wark v. State, 266 A.2d 62 (Me. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 952 (1970),
(escape constituted a sufficiently different fact situation for the legislature to justifi-
ably impose longer sentences on males). See also Seidenberg, The Submissive Ma-
jority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning Women's Rights, 55 CORNELL L. Rv.
262, 264 (1970).
20. 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
21. See Lindsley v. Nat'l Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
22. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
23. 281 F. Supp. at 16.
24. 59 N.J. 334, 282 A.2d 748 (1971).
25. 59 N.J. at 341, 282 A.2d at 754.
26. Id. Subsequently, the defendant cooperated with prosecuting authorities and
was resentenced for a three month term in the Camden County Jail, thereby mooting
the constitutional issue in her case.
27. 411 U.S. 677.
[Vol. 23:389
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. . . classifications based on sex, like classifications based on
race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must
therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.
28
The first to treat the disparate sentencing issue in the wake of Frontiero, the
Chambers court was presented with an opportunity to reinforce the position
of sex as a suspect classification. Unfortunately, Chambers failed to de-
cisively seize that opportunity.
Fundamental Interest vs. Suspect Class
Traditional equal protection analysis applies a strict scrutiny standard (as
opposed to a rational relationship test) generally in two instances: where
a classification is inherently suspect, or where a classification impinges upon
a fundamental personal interest.29 In its decision, the Chambers court fol-
lowed its own lead in Costello and applied a strict judicial scrutiny standard
in determining that New Jersey's disparate sentencing scheme impinged
upon ". . . a fundamental constitutional right . .." indeed a basic right
involving restraint upon one's liberty.
Whereas application of a rational basis standard virtually insures that sex
distinctions will never be held violative of the equal protection clause, appli-
cation of a stricter standard would seem to virtually insure the opposite re-
sult, since most sex classified legislation has been based upon false, stereo-
typed conceptions of female ability, and this type of standard places the bur-
den upon the state to show substantial justification for the classification.
Yet it is important to realize that this result does not necessarily follow.
There can be little doubt that the Chambers court would have applied a
strict scrutiny standard regardless of whether it labeled the discriminatory
sentencing scheme an infringement upon fundamental interest or an in-
stance of discrimination against members of a suspect class. Nor can it
be denied that the same immediate result would have been reached. When
considering the long-term consequences, however, the comparison fails. Re-
liance upon a fundamental interest approach is necessarily ad hoc in nature
and narrow in scope. Declaration of a fundamental interest in one area
offers no guarantee of a like result in any other. In contrast, the declaration
of sex as a suspect class would subject any legislative classification based
28. Id. at 682 (judgment of the Court, written by Brennan, J., in which Douglas,
White, and Marshall, JJ. joined).
29. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (suspect class); Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. at 541 (fundamental personal interest). See
generally 82 HARV. L. REv. 921, 922 (1969); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Pro-
tection: Do We Need A Constitutional Amendment, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499, 1503
(1971).
30. 63 N.J. at 295; 307 A.2d at 82.
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thereupon to constitutional challenge; it may be suggested that much of
such legislation would fall.
Conclusion
Had Chambers relied squarely upon sex as an inherently suspect classifica-
tion rather than upon its glib and indiscriminate interchange of two dif-
ferent standards3l in order to render lip service to the plurality opinion of
Frontiero, it could have greatly clarified the long-range implications of its
decision. Chambers chose to ignore those implications.
While its effort was commendable, Chambers failed to capitalize upon the
opportunity with which it was presented, leaving equal protection in the
area of sex discrimination a concept with shadowy outlines rather than real
form and substance.
Deirdre Dessingue
Jury Trial: The Trial of a Criminal Defendant in a State Pro-
ceeding by a Jury Drawn to Systematically Exclude Residents
of the District in Which the Crime was Committed Violates the
Vicinage Provision of the Sixth Amendment, People v. Jones,
9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108, Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
Introduction
The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant a trial by jury in
federal and state criminal proceedings. However, not all of the elements of
the common law jury have been preserved in the sixth amendment. Only
those features that are essential to the function of the jury are embodied
therein. The common law right of the accused to a jury of the vicinage, ob-
scure in modem usage, was recognized as an element of the sixth amend-
ment guarantee by the California Supreme Court in People v. Jones.'
Leon Dwight Jones, a black resident of the Watts area of inner city Los
Angeles, was charged with the sale of marijuana in his own neighborhood. 2
31. Id.
1. 9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
2. Jones was a resident of the 77th Street Los Angeles Police Department Pre-
[Vol. 23:389
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The trial was held in an overwhelmingly white judicial district of suburban
Los Angeles County.3  Jones was convicted by a jury drawn exclusively from
that judicial district.4  He contended that the jury could constitutionally
have been selected from the entire county or from a portion of the county,
providing that the alleged crime was committed within that portion. A jury
drawn from a part of the county that excluded the locale of the crime, how-
ever, failed to satisfy the sixth amendment vicinage 5 requirement of a jury
of the district where the crime was committed. Jones' argument was re-
jected at the trial and on appeal.6
In reversing the lower appellate decision and ordering a new trial, the
California Supreme Court held that the sixth and fourteenth amendments
guarantee a criminal defendant in a state trial the right to be tried by a jury
selected from the judicial district in which the crime was committed. 7
Recent interpretation of the sixth amendment right to jury trial by the
United States Supreme Court, outlined in Jones, has focused attention on
the historical features of the jury. In Duncan v. Louisiana,8 the sixth
amendment right to jury trial was incorporated into the fourteenth, extend-
cinct. All of the crimes with which he was charged occurred in that precinct. "The
77th Street Precinct is a portion of the City of Los Angeles that is included within
the Central Superior Court District. Geographically, the 77th Street Precinct covers
all of the area of Los Angeles known as Watts. In addition to neighboring areas,
the 77th Street area is predominantly black and poor. There are numerous housing
projects located within that area which combine all the worst features of ghetto living."
Letter from Charles A. Gessler, Deputy Public Defender, County of Los Angeles, to
the Catholic University Law Review, Sept. 21, 1973.
3. Los Angeles County is divided into Superior Court Districts. The crime was
committed in the Central District. Jones was tried in the Southwest District. "On
May 26, 1970, the presiding judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court ordered that
all crimes committed in the 77th Street Precinct be tried in the Southwest District
instead of the Central District, 'because there were not enough judges or courtrooms
downtown to handle the volume of work, and it was contemplated that the 77th Street
cases would be tried in the Southwest District until the new Criminal Courts Build-
ing was completed in downtown Los Angeles in the Fall of 1972'," 9 Cal.3d at 548,
510 P.2d at 707, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
4. "During this period all jurors who sat on cases in the Southwest District were
drawn from the geographical area known as the Southwest District. Jurors who resided
in the 77th Street Precinct of the Central District were not drawn for jury service
in the Southwest District, but were drawn to serve exclusively in the Central District.
However, the Jury Commissioner of Los Angeles County indicated that it would be
possible to select and transport residents of the 77th Street Precinct to the Southwest
District to serve as jurors." Id.
5. The jury of the vicinage at common law was the traditional selection of the
jury from the area, usually the county, where the cause of action arose. Vicinage
should not be confused with venue. The two concepts are related but not identical.
Venue is the place where the trial is held. Theoretically, the trial can be held any-
where and the jury still drawn from the vicinage.
6. The procedure at trial is discussed at 9 Cal. 3d at 548-49, 510 P.2d at 707, 108
Cal. Rptr. at 347. Jones' appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals of the Second
District, 103 Cal. Rptr. 475 (App. 1973).
7. 9 Cal. 3d at 555, 510 P.2d at 712, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
8. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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ing that right to defendants in state criminal trials. It was subsequently
held in Williams v. Florida9 that not all of the elements of the common law
jury must be preserved by the states, only those essential to the function of
the jury. The Jones court further relied upon a line of Supreme Court deci-
sions, the most recent of which is Peters v. Kif,10 emphasizing the accused's
right to a jury representing a cross-section of the community.
In light of the Supreme Court decisions in this area, the Jones holding,
that the accused's sixth amendment rights are violated when the jury is
drawn to systematically exclude persons from the vicinage, asserts not only
that the common law vicinage requirement was included in the sixth amend-
ment, but that it is presently promotive of the function of the jury.
A Brief Narrative on the History of Vicinage
Available historical evidence supports the assertion that a jury of the vicin-
age, considered an essential feature of the common law right to jury trial,
was included although redefined in the sixth amendment when it was
adopted.
Trial by jury of the vicinage is deeply embedded in English common law
tradition." Originally, jurors served as witnesses and, as a result, had to
be familiar with the facts of each case. 12 They were of necessity residents
of the area where the crime was committed, the vicinage. As the jury func-
tion was transformed from witness to trier of fact, jurors continued to be
drawn locally. What originated as an administrative necessity developed
into an important democratic institution: the protection of the accused from
arbitrary government prosecution through community representation on the
jury.'
3
By the eighteenth century, the right to be tried by a jury of the vicinage
was considered the inalienable right of all English subjects. Whether it
travelled across the Atlantic Ocean with the English colonists, however, was
a highly controversial issue. Repeated attempts by the Crown and Parlia-
ment to abolish the jury of the vicinage as it pertained to certain crimes
9. 399 U.S. 78 (1969).
10. 407 U.S. 493 (1972). See also Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942); Thiel v. Southern Pacific, 328 U.S. 217 (1946);
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
11. See F. HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, 3-12 (1951) [hereinafter cited as HELLER] and Blume, The Place of Trial of
Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REV. 594 (1944).
12. HELLER at 7-8.
13. "This idea of the jury representing the public of a particular locality had
enormous consequences in an age when representative institutions were rapidly devel-
oping." PLUCKNET, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 126 (2d ed. 1936).
[Vol. 23: 389
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helped precipitate the American revolution.' 4
The sixth amendment as originally proposed provided for the right to
trial by "jury of the freeholders of the vicinage."'15 This language was op-
posed on the grounds that it was unnecessary in light of the then pending
Judiciary Bill. 6 There was further disagreement over whether the word
vicinage imposed too strict or too flexible a requirement. The resulting
language of the sixth amendment providing for a jury "of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed" reflected a compro-
mise between broad and narrow definitions of the term and left Congress
to determine the outer boundaries of the area from which the jury was to be
selected. 17 The sixth amendment, although not employing the term vicinage
itself, did include the juror residence requirement.
That the jury of the vicinage was originally provided for in the sixth
amendment does not determine its present application in state trials. It is
a generally accepted proposition that when interpreting the provisions of
the constitution, deference is given to the meaning of the terms as used
historically in England and in the United States at the time of their adoption.
The Supreme Court in Williams v. Florida substituted a different test in
the sixth amendment area. In order to justify including a common law fea-
ture of the jury, ". . the function that the particular feature performs and
its relation to the purposes of the jury trial" must be demonstrated.' 8 In
Jones, the issue becomes whether a jury of the vicinage is functionally essen-
tial to the purpose of the jury trial.
The Jones Court Fails the Williams Test by Avoiding the Question
Unfortunately the Jones court chose not to confront this issue squarely. In-
stead of exploring the relationship between the contemporary jury function
and the ancient common law vicinage requirement, the court merely con-
cluded that "[i]t thus seems abundantly clear that the 'vicinage' requirement
14. The Stamp Act provided for revenue offenses to be tried in Admiralty Court
where trial by jury was traditionally unavailable. On May 16, 1769, the Virginia
House of Burgesses met to protest against the transporting of Massachusetts colonists
to England for trial under an old English statute, 35 Hen. 8, and drew up the Vir-
ginia Resolves asserting that, "thereby the inestimable Privilege of being tried by a
Jury of the Vicinage, as well as the Liberty of summoning and producing Witnesses
on such Trial, will be taken away. . . ." Virginia Resolves of May 16, 1769, JOURNALS
OF THE HousE OF BuRGEssEs, 1766-69 at 214 (Kennedy ed. 1906). In 1776 the colo-
nists' grievances culminated in the Declaration of Independence, in which the Crown
was condemned "for transporting us beyond the seas for pretended offenses."
15. 1 Annals of Congress 435 (1789), cited in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 94,
n.36.
16. HELLER at 31-32.
17. Id. at 32.
18. 399 U.S. at 99.
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. . .is an essential feature of the jury trial. ... "19 To conclude from its
history that vicinage is essential to the jury trial is to miss the thrust of Wil-
liams. It can be demonstrated that the common law required a twelve man
jury. 2° This did not prevent the Williams court from dismissing the number
twelve as an historical accident and holding that the states were not re-
quired to provide a jury of twelve.21 The superficiality of the discussion in
Jones leaves vicinage open to the same attack and conceivably the same fate
in future cases.
Reliance on Peters v. Kiff only adds to the dubiousness of the court's
reasoning. Although Peters discusses "a fair possibility for obtaining a rep-
resentative cross-section of the community," 22 the sixth amendment was not
brought into play in that case. 23 The concern in Peters is with the exclusion
of a recognizable class of the population, not residents of certain neighbor-
hoods. Representation is not unrelated to vicinage in that both are con-
cerned with the makeup of the jury, but the lack of clear distinction drawn
between them in Jones detracts from the force of its reasoning.
Ferreting Out Precedent
Recognizing that vicinage was not clearly mandated by Supreme Court deci-
sions and that it has rarely been judicially recognized, the Jones court relied
on two lower court cases, Alvarado v. State24 and State v. Brown,25 as per-
suasive authority for their decision.
Alvarado receives particular attention despite the fact that vicinage was
confused therein with cross-sectional representation and is therefore susceptible
to a reading not encompassing vicinage whatsoever. The facts of the case
are highlighted as illustrating the purpose of the vicinage requirement. Al-
varado, a native Alaskan from a remote area of the state, was charged with
rape and convicted by a jury selected from within fifteen miles of Anchor-
age, 26 a large metropolitan area. The issue, stated as whether Alvarado's
jury was drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, 27 encompassed
vicinage when community was defined as including the location of the al-
leged offense. 28  In light of the vast cultural differences between the resi-
19. 9 Cal. 3d at 551, 510 P.2d at 709, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
20. 399 U.S. at 98-100.
21. Id. at 87-90.
22. 407 U.S. at 500, quoting language from Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at
100.
23. Peters' prosecution was begun in state court before Duncan was decided and
went off on due process rather than sixth amendment grounds.
24. 486 P.2d 891 (Alaska, 1971).
25. 295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
26. 486 P.2d at 892.
27. Id. at 898.
28. Id. at 902 n.28.
[Vol. 23: 389
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dents of Anchorage and the minority native population, the Supreme Court
of Alaska held that the jury did not represent the neighborhood where
the crime took place, and thus violated Alvarado's sixth amendment rights.
2 9
Further ambiguity was added by a footnote stating that if the jury was rep-
resentative of the neighborhood in which the alleged offense occurred, it
need not be drawn from there.30 In spite of its equivocation, Alvarado
specifically promotes a vicinage provision within the sixth amendment and
the Jones court had no clearer precedent upon which to rely.
State v. Brown, the first case to recognize a defendant's constitutional right
to a jury of the vicinage in a state criminal case, was also advanced in sup-
port of the Jones holding. Brown, despite cogent historical analysis, :1 is of
limited use as precedent. It is a lower federal court case from a different
circuit and its vicinage discussion is dicta. It was held that the removal of
the trial from the county in which the crime was committed over defendant's
objection did not violate his sixth amendment rights. 32 Vicinage was dis-
tinguished from venue when the Brown court added that the defendant
could later move to have jurors from the original county impanelled.83
After demonstrating the inclusion of a vicinage provision into the sixth
amendment, the California Supreme Court relied upon an essentially irrele-
vant decision in Peters, the logic if not the phraseology of Alvarado and dicta
in Brown, in support of its decision. The lack of clear precedent for the
Jones decision reflects the near extinction of vicinage in modern usage, but
not necessarily its merit. A clear and more forceful presentation of the
function of vicinage and its relation to the purpose of the jury trial would
have been more persuasive.
If the Decision is Correct There Must be a Reason
Alternative arguments existed that might have more directly met the Wil-
29. Id. at 904.
30. Id. at 902 n.29.
31, 295 F. Supp. at 79-81. Brown was cited by the Supreme Court in Williams,
399 U.S. 78, 93 n.35, in its historical discussion of the adoption of the sixth amend-
ment.
32. 295 F. Supp. at 82.
33. [T]here would appear to be nothing in the federal constitution to prevent a
state from trying any criminal anywhere within the state, with a state-wide
jury or with a jury selected from residents of the jurisdiction in which the al-
leged offenses were committed. While there may be due process, equal pro-
tection, or other constitutional limitations on the power of a state govern-
mental system arbitrarily to exclude from a jury panel residents of the juris-
diction in which the crimes have allegedly been committed, a defendant
would seem to have no right to be tried by a jury which is selected from a
population base which includes such residents if a fair and impartial jury can-
not thereby be provided. . . . Id. at 83 (original italics), cited in Jones
at 9 Cal. 3d at 553, 510 P.2d at 710, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
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liams issue. For example, Duncan v. Louisiana, in which the right to jury
trial was extended to the states, might have been utilized to greater ad-
vantage. Duncan recognized the essentially political nature of the jury, its
traditional function being the protection of the accused from government
oppression and arbitrary prosecution,8 4 the same function vicinage was tra-
ditionally considered to have performed. 5
. If vicinage is indeed promoting the ends of contemporary justice, it is
because subcommunities exist isolated from each other, albeit in a different
way than in common law England. 6 Jones lived in Watts and was tried by
34. The guarantees of jury trial in the federal and state constitutions reflect
a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and
justice administered. A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants
in order to prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our
constitution knew from history and experience that it was necessary to pro-
tect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate enemies and
against judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority. The framers
of the constitution strove to create an independent judiciary but insisted upon
further protection against arbitrary action. Providing the accused with the
right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard
against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and the compliant, biased or ec-
centric judge. . . . Fear of unchecked power, so typical of our State and
Federal Governments in other respects, found expression in the criminal law
in this insistence upon community participation in the determination of guilt
or innocence. 391 U.S. at 155-56 (italics added).
35. See Note, Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases, 69 COLUM. L. Rav. 419 (1969).
It is pointed out there that Duncan's extension of the right to jury to the states cannot
be satisfactorily explained in terms of fairness to the defendant without proof of
judicial partiality in state courts. Nor can it be said that a jury is a more accurate
finder of fact than a judge. id. at 422-24. The jury as described in Duncan is a
democratic institution, a sort of mini-legislature to check against the majority will.
See note 34 supra.
One aspect of the jury as a democratic institution is jury nullification. Id. at 425.
According to the doctrine of jury nullification, jurors have the inherent right to set
aside the instructions of the judge and reach a verdict of acquittal based upon their
own consciences, and the defendant has a right to have the jury so instructed. This
doctrine has been adversely settled in most jurisdictions, This is not to say, however,
that with or without instructions on nullification, juries do not refuse to enforce harsh
laws either at all or to their full measure. One commentator has described jury nulli-
fication as a "kind of repository of grass roots democracy" since ordinary citizens can
effectively say no to their rulers when their policies and laws are no longer in touch
with the will of the people. L. VELVEL, UNDECLARED WAR AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
215 (1970). See also Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 So. CAL.
L.R. 168 (1972) discussing jury nullification at length and advocating its formal res-
toration.
36. The court of appeals in upholding Jones' conviction, denied the contemporary
utility of the vicinage provision. "Seemingly, it arose as a requirement of English
law at a time when communities were isolated by limited facilities of communication
and transportation. No longer are the social mores and customs of a community de-
veloped in isolation, uninfluenced by the conduct and thinking of others which now
may be learned about through newspapers, or through radio, television or other facili-
ties of communication, or from travel." 103 Cal. Rptr. at 479. This interesting and
debatable question, whether Watts is more isolated from suburban Los Angeles than




suburbanites of Los Angeles County. If Jones could get a different reaction
from those jurors than from the residents of Watts and if the two areas view
the criminality of the sale of marijuana differently, vicinage serves a pur-
pose. Different communities have different lifestyles and different notions
of justice which through the vicinage requirement can be injected into an
otherwise arbitrary criminal system. 7 This is implied but never sufficiently
articulated by the Jones court.
The overall effect of vicinage upon society could also have been empha-
sized. To require that a jury be drawn from the locale of the crime induces
community participation in the criminal process serving to legitimize the
system itself.
38
The weakness of the reasoning in Jones is not only that these particular
suggestions were not pursued, but that no real effort was made to demon-
strate the contemporary function of vicinage in response to the obvious ar-
gument that vicinage is a mere anachronism.
Conclusion
People v. Jones is noteworthy in its recognition of the right to a jury of the
vicinage as an independent provision of the sixth amendment and its ac-
knowledgement of the present vitality of an ancient common law protec-
tion. If we are to be persuaded that Jones is anything more than a peculiarly
strict common law interpretation of the constitution, and if other courts are to
accept this reading of the sixth amendment, clearer distinctions and more
forceful advocacy will be needed.
William W. Osborne Jr.
37. See note 35 supra. See also Note, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J.
531 (1970).
38. The Alaskan Supreme Court discussed community participation in the jury in
Alvarado. "As an institution, the jury offers our citizens the opportunity to participate
in the workings of our government, and serves to legitimize our system of justice in
the eyes of both the public and the accused." 486 P.2d at 903. See also notes 34
and 37 supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -Fourteenth Amendment - Equal
Protection-By creating classifications which have no rational
basis, the California Guest Statute violates both state and federal
equal protection guarantees. Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal.3d 855, 506
P.2d 212, 106 Cal.Rptr. 388 (1973).
During the late 1920's and early 1930's, 30 states passed so-called "guest"
statutes.' With one notable exception 2 guest statutes had survived both
federal and state constitutional attack until the decision in Brown v. Merlo.3
The fact pattern in Brown was not unusual, as it is continually encoun-
tered in one form or another in automobile guest/host litigation. Two friends
on a hunting trip were involved in an accident allegedly caused by the or-
dinary negligence of the driver-host. Guest passenger Brown suffered severe
injuries. Finding the plaintiff to be within the ambit of the guest statute,
the superior court granted summary judgment to the defendant. The Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals upheld the lower court decision, but two of the
three affirming judges concurred only because the California Supreme Court
had refused to grant hearings in two earlier cases which had questioned the
legitimacy of the guest statute.
This article will review both federal and state handling of the equal pro-
tection issue in guest statute cases, discuss the California experience and
judicial climate presaging Brown, examine the Court's analysis of the argu-
ments offered to support guest legislation in California, and analyze the
methodological approach taken by the Brown Court.
The Equal Protection Issue-Federal and State
Under the common law of most states,4 a rider was protected against the or-
I. The gist of all guest acts is that persons riding for free in automobiles are
owed no duty of ordinary care by their driver-hosts. Rather, recovery for negligently
inflicted injuries is limited to cases involving egregious misconduct by the driver. For
a listing of guest legislation, as well as a summary of the types of driver behavior
falling beyond the pale of what might be termed permissably negligent conduct, see
Bennington, The Ohio Guest Statute, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 631, 632 (1961).
2. Ludwig v. Johnson, 243 Ky. 534, 49 S.W.2d 347 (1932).. Although guest acts
in Oregon and Delaware were declared unconstitutional as originally written, they were
upheld in amended form in Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Ore. 330, 40 P.2d 1009 (1935),
and Gallegher v. Davis, 37 Del. 380, 183 A. 620 (1936).
3. 8 Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973).
4. The exceptions are Georgia (Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 399, 106 S.E. 297
(1921)), Massachusetts (Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168 (1917)),
Virginia (Boggs v. Plybon, 157 Va. 30, 160 S.E. 77 (1931)), and Washington (Saxe
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dinary negligence of his driver. With the advent of the guest statutes, the
question arose whether the statutory exclusion of an automobile guest from
recovery (absent some form of recklessly negligent behavior by the driver-
host) was a violation of the guest's fourteenth amendment equal protection
rights. The Supreme Court answered the question in Silver v. Silver5 by
upholding the validity of the Connecticut guest act.6 After first taking judi-
cial notice of an increasing frequency of vehicular guest/host litigation, the
Court deferred to the judgment of the legislature as to whether such actions
had become seriously vexatious. 7 The Court pointed out that the legislation
need not strike at every class to which it might be applied, thus permitting
specific distinctions between gratuitous passengers in motor cars and those
in other forms of conveyance. Silver marked the last federal constitu-
tional challenge to guest acts.
Most state courts reaching the equal protection question have cited Silver,
and some have ventured beyond the broad assertion of legislative authority
made by the Silver Court to fill in the underlying purposes behind the legis-
lative decision to enact guest statutes. Recurring throughout these decisions
are the theories that guest statutes deter fraudulent lawsuits concocted by
a driver and guest against the driver's insurer, and that a gratuitous guest
passenger should not be permitted to repay his host's generosity by bringing
a tort action for ordinary negligence against him. Reciting either or both of
these justifications, state courts uniformly concluded that they constituted suf-
ficient rational bases to support legislative passage of guest acts.8  Even
v. Terry, 140 Wash. 503, 250 P. 27 (1926)). The latter two states passed guest acts
subsequent to the common law decisions. For a fine articulation. of the majority rule,
see Munson v. Rupker, 148 N.E. 169 (Ind. App. 1925).
5. 280 U.S. 117 (1929).
6. Laws 1927, c. 308, GEN. ST. CONN., 1930, § 1628 (repealed 1937).
7. The Court continued, "[In] this day of almost universal transportation by motor
car, we cannot say that abuses originating in the multiplicity of suits growing out
of the gratuitous carriage of passengers . . . do not present so conspicuous an example
of what the legislature may regard as an evil, as to justify legislation aimed at it.
280 U.S. at 123-24 (emphasis added). Note that this theory of rationality is based
upon a broad presumption of the suitability and validity of legislative acts generally.
The Court did not deal with specific purposes underlying the Connecticut act.
8. See Clarke v. Storchak, 384 Ill. 564, 52 N.E.2d 229 (1944) (hospitality); Mc-
Millan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2d 867 (1942) (hospitality); Bailey v. Resner,
168 Kan. 439, 214 P.2d 323 (1950) (collusiveness); Roberson v. Roberson, 101 S.W.2d
961 (Ark. 1937) (hospitality plus citation of Silver); Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Ore.
330, 40 P.2d 1009 (1935) (hospitality and collusiveness). See generally Naudzius
v. Lahr, 253 Mich. 216, 218-19, 234 N.W. 581, 583-84 (1931) for a catalog of possible
reasonable bases for guest legislation. It is submitted that a state purpose ostensibly to
provide decreased insurance rates by keeping the insurer out of court, thus benefitting
the motoring public, could be conceived of as effecting a reasonable legislative result
(though less than enlightened social policy), and might be sufficient to withstand ra-
tional basis scrutiny. Although various authors have questioned the validity of claims
that guest acts have produced lower insurance rates (See Tipton, Florida's Automobile
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the severest judicial and academic critics of guest legislation, 9 seemingly
conceding the constitutional issues as settled, have urged legislative repeal
as the appropriate redress.' 0
The California Experience
In California, the constitutionality of the original guest act had never been
adjudicated," but the traditionally proferred rationale of preventing collusive
lawsuits had been undermined by a series of cases 12 which eliminated the
entire range of interfamilial tort immunities. Since these immunities were
premised on the theory that negligence actions between family members
would be fraught with collusive possibilities, the judicial rejection of collusive
interfamilial justifications applied a fortiori to host/guest situations often in-
volving unrelated or even unacquainted persons.' 3 Furthermore, the Cali-
Guest Statute, 11 U. FLA. L. REv. 287, 304-07 (1958), and Bennington, supra note
1, at 642-43), statistical surveys linking lower (or higher) insurance premiums to guest
legislation are inconclusive. For some support of the money motive theory, see Com-
ment, The Illinois Guest Statute: An Analysis & Reappraisal, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 263,
265 n.4 (1959).
9. See Brown v. Merlo, 8 Cal. 3d 855, 883 n.22, 506 P.2d 212, 232 n.22, 106
Cal. Rptr. 388, 408 n.22 for a listing of judicial and academic opinions opposing guest
statutes. See also Casper, The Ohio Guest Statute, 10 CINN. L. REv. 289 (1936). This
writer was able to find only two academic articles unabashedly supporting the desirabil-
ity of guest acts. For a ride down memory lane on solid tires, see Meissner, Liability
of Automobile Drivers to Gratuitous Passengers Under the Wisconsin Law, 18 MARQ.
L. REV. 1 (1933), and Note, Validity of Statute Limiting Liability of Automobile
Owner to Gratuitous Passengers (U.S. (Conn.) 1930), 2 ROCKY M. L. REV. 263 (1960).
10. The opinion in Miller v. Huizinga, 23 Mich. App. 363, 365, 178 N.W.2d 542,
544 (1970) is typical:
[The] plaintiff asserts that the provision of the Michigan guest passenger
statute . . . is unconstitutional, because it violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution .... That an argument in support of plaintiff's claims can be as-
serted is not in contest. However, the United States Supreme Court and
Michigan Supreme Court have ruled the act constitutional. Plaintiff's appeal
for a change in the law is made in the wrong forum. It should be addressed
to the legislature for attention.
11. In Patton v. LaBree, 60 Cal. 2d 606, 608, 387 P.2d 398, 400, 35 Cal. Rptr.
622, 624 (1963), the California Supreme Court upheld the classification created by
amendment to the original act which included the owner riding as a passenger under
guest act coverage. The Court held that the legislature may have considered the own-
er's right to control the driver of the vehicle to legally distinguish the owner from
a paying passenger, thus supplying a rational basis for the amendment. Note the dis-
sent by Justice Peters on the ground that there is no rational reason to differentiate
between a paying nonowner passenger and a paying owner passenger, but stopping
short of the broader question of the distinction between paying and nonpaying guests.
The expressed theory of equal protection analysis utilized by both the majority and
dissent differs little from the standard federal test outlined by the United States Su-
preme Court in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., note 28 infra.
12. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955); Klein v. Klein, 58
Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,
479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971).
13. 8 Cal. 3d at 875, 506 P.2d at 222, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 402.
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fornia Supreme Court, in Muskopf v. Corning Hospital District,14 had dis-
carded the governmental immunity doctrine, largely on the ground that
unequal treatment was being afforded similarly situated persons.',
Although the immunity decisions involved the common law and were
therefore not controlling in the area of guest statutes, they indicated a clear
judicial desire to provide negligently injured parties with legal remedies
whenever possible. The decisions also showed specific judicial antipathy
toward overinclusive classifications (infringing upon the legal remedies of
many in order to protect against possible collusive recovery for a few),16
and toward underinclusive categories (allowing happenstance of time, loca-
tion, etc., to determine recovery rights of negligently injured persons).17
In Olson v. Clifton,'8 specific judicial interest in the question of guest act
constitutionality was manifested by the court of appeals.
[C]ogent reasons have been advanced to show that the guest act
should be abolished or declared unconstitutional. . . . Never-
theless, until it is repealed or adjudged unconstitutional when
properly so attacked, it represents the mandate of the Legisla-
ture .... 19
The California Supreme Court chose the Brown case to delineate the
proper line of attack. Speaking through Justice Tobriner, the Court first dis-
tinguished Silver as outmoded in its 40 year old emphasis upon the unique-
14. 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457, 11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961).
15. "[Some] who are injured by government agencies can recover, others cannot:
one injured while attending a community theatre in a public park may recover . . . but
one injured in a children's playground may not ...... Id. at 214, 359 P.2d at 460, 11
Cal. Rptr. at 92. Similar types of providence, or the lack thereof, in guest statutes, in-
clude requirements that the injury take place, "during the ride," "in any vehicle" and
"upon the highway," in order for recovery to be restricted to instances of extraordinary
negligence.
16. For an example of the type of overinclusive classification referred to by the
Brown Court, see Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
17. So many technical limitations had become incorporated in the guest act that,
as stated in O'Donnell v. Mullaney, 66 Cal. 2d 994, 998, 429 P.2d 160, 162, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 840, 842 (1967), "the relationship between the driver and occupant of a motor
vehicle may fluctuate during the course of a single trip, as circumstances bring them
within or without the language of the statute." Thus, in Prager v. Israel, 15 Cal.
2d 89, 98 P.2d 729 (1940), the critical distinction was the positioning of the guest's
feet vis i vis the automobile, while in Olson v. Clifton, 273 Cal. App. 2d 359, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 296 (1969), the location of the vehicle in relation to the road was controlling
and in O'Donnell, the situs of the accident was determinative. Since the above fac-
tors bear no relation to the express legislative purposes of protecting hospitality or
preventing collusion, they have no foundation in the realities of life, and are under-
inclusive indicators that similarly situated persons receive dissimilar treatment before
the law. For a precise, scholarly treatment of equal protection requirements relating
to overinclusive and underinclusive legislatives classifications, see Tussman and ten-
Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. Rv. 341 (1949).
18. 273 Cal. App. 2d 359, 78 Cal. Rptr. 296 (1969).
19. Id. at 370, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 302 (emphasis added).
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ness of automobiles and out of focus in its treatment of the guest statute
as merely one of many automobile regulatory devices which had developed
during the 1920's. It held that the Silver Court had confined its decision
solely to the categorical distinction between vehicular guests and guests in
all other conveyances, 20 thereby ignoring legislatively created classification
discriminations between paying and nonpaying guests, between automobile
and all other types of social invitees, and between various subclasses of ve-
hicular guests ("in a car," "on a highway," etc.). 21 Whatever the anachro-
nistic flavor of Silver, and however many types of classifications may have
been overlooked or ignored by the Silver Court, the Brown Court faced
the heavy burden of overcoming the presumption of validity (explicit in
Silver)22 accompanying legislative acts. This the Brown Court attempted to
do by scrutinizing the "hospitality" and "collusive lawsuit" rationales and
rejecting them as irrational, arbitrary and therefore insufficient to support
the guest statute.
Protection of Hospitality as Rational Basis
The Court held that even if protection of hospitality were a legitimate state
purpose, there would still be no adequate explanation why automobile guests
are distinguished from other guests and recipients of hospitality.23  Since
California law requires that hosts generally owe a duty of ordinary care
to their guests,2 4 the failure of the guest act to provide a similar duty where
automobile guests were concerned created an arbitrary discrimination be-
tween classes of guests. The Court also felt that the existence of almost
universal personal liability insurance coverage eliminated the personal nature
of suits for damages, and thus removed any inherent aspects of ingratitude
from the legal proceedings. 25
Possibility of Collusiveness as Rational Basis
While admitting that "[a] small segment of that class [automobile guests]
may file collusive lawsuits", the Court held that the guest act "[presents]
a classic case of an impermissibly overinclusive classification scheme, that
20. 8 Cal. 3d at 863 n.4, 506 P.2d at 217 n.4, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393 n.4.
21. Id. at 863-64 n.4, 506 P.2d at 217-18 n.4, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94 n.4. Since
these other forms of classification discrimination had been ignored by the Silver Court,
the Brown Court held that "[n]o prior case has adjudicated the present constitutional
claim ...... Id. at 863, 506 P.2d at 217, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393. See 8 Cal. 3d at
863-64 n.4, 506 P.2d at 217-18 n.4, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 393-94 n.4, for the Brown court
rejection of Silver.
22. 280 U.S. at 123.
23. 8 Cal. 3d at 864, 506 P.2d at 218, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 394.
24. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
25. 8 Cal. 3d at 867, 506 P.2d at 221, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
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is, a scheme in which a statute's classification 'imposes a burden upon a
wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those tainted with
the mischief at which the law aims.' ",26 It is noted that the very premise
of collusive relations among parties presupposes a willingness to commit
perjury, to violate insurance statutes, and otherwise to subvert efforts to
obtain fair results. Since the host and guest passenger need only state that
compensation in some form was rendered-a simple and totally effective
method to avoid application of the provisions of the guest statute-parties
denied recovery by the guest act would logically only include those whose
sense of fair play and honesty, or whose lack of personal acquaintanceship,
would inherently contradict the collusiveness rationale.
Rational Basis Standards-Federal and State
In California, the expressed standard for rationality to determine the con-
stitutionality of legislative enactments differentiating among classes of per-
sons had closely followed the four part test set forth in Lindsley v. Natural
Carbonic Gas Co.2 7 The most pertinent part therein required that "[I]f
any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain [the stat-
ute], the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted
must be assumed."28 The Brown Court refused to strain its imagination to
come up with any highly improbable, though conceivable, legislative pur-
pose. Justice Tobriner cited examples29 of what he felt were "artifical
analyses" used by the United States Supreme Court to uphold state statutes,
contrasting these with recent Supreme Court decisions requiring more sub-
stantial justifications.3 0  By limiting its inquiry to the two justifications dis-
26. Id. at 876, 506 P.2d at 227, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 403, citing Tussman and ten-
Broek, supra note 17, at 351. "[Overinclusive] classifications fly squarely in the face
of our traditional antipathy to assertions of mass guilt by association .. " Id.
27. 220 U.S. 61 (1911). In searching for only a rational basis test to uphold
the guest legislation, the Brown Court rejected the plaintiff's contention that automo-
bile guests constitute a "suspect classification" which would require "strict scrutiny"
of the statute. Interestingly, the Court included in its definition of suspect classes
"... racial or sexual classifications ..." 8 Cal. 3d at 862 n.2, 506 P.2d at 216
n.2, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 392 n.2 (emphasis added).
28. 220 U.S. at 78. In Patton v. LaBree, 60 Cal. 2d at 608, 387 P.2d at 400,
35 Cal. Rptr. at 624, the California Supreme Court (with Justice Tobriner part of the
majority) asserted that a legislative classification would be sustained unless "[no] set
of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it...." Justice Peters in dis-
sent employed a similar test: "[I]f any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain [the statute] there is a presumption of the existence of that state of
facts .. " Id. at 611, 387 P.2d at 403, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 627.
29. 8 Cal. 3d at 865 n.7, 506 P.2d at 219 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395 n.7, citing
Kotch v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948).
30. For a listing thereof, see 8 Cal. 3d at 865 n.7, 506 P.2d at 219 n.7, 106 Cal.
Rptr. at 395 n.7.
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cussed above, the Brown Court followed what it considered the trend in fed-
eral equal protection decisions."'
Conclusion
If it is essentially correct that "[I]t has been several centuries since an
English jurist could assert with a straight face that, 'An act of Parliament can
do no wrong . . . though it may do several things that look pretty odd,' ",82
then why must such queer legislative creations as guest statutes have per-
sisted for 40 odd years when such a seemingly straightforward remedy as
that advanced in Brown has been available? The answer lies in the pre-
viously mentioned extremely heavy presumption of constitutionality attend-
ing every statute and the concomitant theory that ". . . the legislature is
the body best suited to the eradication of pernicious statutes and the ballot
box is the best stimulus to achieve that end." 83  However, where there exists
a class of potential plaintiffs whose membership in the class is not forseeable
(negligently injured guest passengers are prime examples), the repeal of
unwise legislative acts fails for lack of sufficient spokesmen, particularly
against large, well-financed groups (such as the insurance industry) for
whom the legislation has proven economically advantageous.
8 4
For those state courts which have recited with more clarity than logical
support the "hospitality" and "collusiveness" rationales, the Brown decision
provides new material for judicial consideration. 5 The larger question remains
31. Whatever the accuracy of its prediction of a federal trend, the Court held that
.. it would be inappropriate to . . . sustain the present statute in the face of our
state constitutional guarantees" thus carving out an independent state ground for its
decision in Brown. Id. at 865-66 n.7, 506 P.2d at 219-20 n.7, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 395-
96 n.7.
32. Lascher, Hard Laws Make Bad Cases-Lots of Them (The California Guest
Statute), 9 SANTA CLARA LAW. 1, 7 (1968), citing City of London v. Wood, 12 Mod.
669, 687-88, 88 Eng. Rep. 1592, 1601 (1701).
33. Id. at 7.
34. The Kansas experience is typical:
[Legislatively], numerous efforts have been made-in 1941, 1945, 1949, 1951
and 1953-to repeal the guest statute. Only one of these, Senate Bill No.
196 in 1949, succeeded in passing the legislative body in which it originated,
but even it later died in the House. As recently as the 1957 legislative ses-
sion, the Senate judiciary committee killed a measure proposed to repeal the
guest statute. The bill was supported before the committee by the Kansas
Plaintiffs Attorneys Association and opposed by insurance companies and
corporations. ...
See Comment, Gross and Wanton Negligence: A Quarter Century Under the Kansas
Guest Statute, 5 U. KAN. L. REV. 722, 724 (1957). Note that almost 20 further
years have elapsed since this recitation of legislative efforts to repeal the guest act
but the guest act remains, in Kansas as elsewhere.
35. Language such as the following, without more, should no longer suffice: "[The]
vehicle is the means by which the guest is able to enjoy the generosity and cordiality
extended him. . . . Thus [the court] believe[s] the classification on the basis of
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as to whether use of fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantees to
strike down legislative acts such as the California guest statute is a legitimate
judicial approach. Those courts finding validity in the Brown methodology
will be able to fashion remedies under the law for those unable to find effec-
tive relief at the statehouse.
David W. Huston
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process Requires a Standard
of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt for Involuntary Civil
Commitment. In Re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
What standard of proof should be required to deprive an individual of his
freedom? Should the answer depend upon the specific grounds on which
society seeks to confine a person? The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit has just recently considered these due proc-
ess issues within the context of involuntary civil commitment. In In Re
Ballay the court concluded that regardless of the reason behind institutionaliza-
tion, the magnitude of individual interests at stake requires the same standard
of proof as that needed to imprison.
Pursuant to the District of Columbia Code,' involuntary civil commitment
proceedings were instituted in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia after John Ballay had returned to the White House for the sec-
ond time within one month to request an audience with the President. He
had presented himself as both a senator from Illinois and the husband of
Tricia Nixon. Ballay was ordered committed to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital
upon a jury determination that he was "mentally ill and, because of that
illness, . . . likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at
liberty .... -2 The district court instructed the jury that commitment
ownership is clearly reasonable, and certainly it cannot be said to be devoid of reason
and to be wholly arbitrary and capricious .... ." Romero v. Tilton, 78 N.M. 696,
700, 437 P.2d 157, 163 (1967) (Decision upholding the constitutional validity of the
New Mexico guest statute.
1. 21 D.C. CoDE ANN. §§ 521-45 (1973).
2. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 21 D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 545(b) (1973) in relevant part provides:
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required finding the presence of both statutory elements by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. Confronted with the issue of whether Ballay was de-
nied due process of law because the jury did not determine beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that he was both mentally ill and consequently dangerous,
the court of appeals could find no individual or state interest sufficient to
offset the greater potential for a wrongful deprivation of liberty inherent
in the lesser standard of proof. Consequently, the court held that Ballay
had been deprived of due process by the lower court's failure to instruct the
jury that they must be convinced of the dual allegation beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The standard of proof required by the district court clearly reflected that
of prior case law.3 However until the instant appeal, no District of Colum-
bia case had ever presented a direct challenge to this aspect of civil commit-
ment procedure. In reversing the district court, the court scrutinized the
interests at stake, analyzed the standard of proof itself and extrapolated the
reasoning of relevant due process case law to arrive at its decision. The
court found that each of these levels of analysis converged on but one clear
outcome. In holding proof beyond a reasonable doubt to be the requisite
standard for involuntary civil commitment, the court's opinion represents
a triumph of substance over form.
The Precedential Background
It has been said that one out of every three American families is likely to
experience the commitment of one of its members. 4  However, the magni-
tude of litigation focusing upon the rights of the mentally ill has been sur-
prisingly slight." It is only within the last few years that significant progress
If the court or the jury, as the case may be, finds that the person is not
mentally ill, the court shall dismiss the petition and order his release. If the
court or the jury finds that the person is mentally ill and, because of that ill-
ness, is likely to injure himself or other persons if allowed to remain at lib-
erty, the court may order his hospitalization for an indeterminate period, or
order any other alternative course of treatment which the court believes will
be in the best interests of the person or of the public.
3. See, In re Alexander, 372 F.2d 925, 927 (D.C. Cir. 1967) and Bolton v. Harris,
395 F.2d 642, 651 n.50 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
4. Hearings on S. 3261 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., at 11 (1961). Presently, there
are at least 600,000 persons in mental hospitals. Furthermore, approximately 250,000
more individuals labeled as mentally retarded are confined in other forms of residential
institutions. Mental Health Law Project, Basic Rights of the Mentally Handicapped,
1973 p. 1.
5. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), the Court invalidated the summary
commitment, until "certified sane", of a mentally defective deaf mute and commented
upon the infrequency of challenges to state power in this area:
Considering the number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the
substantive constitutional limitations on this power have not been more fre-
quently litigated. 406 U.S. at 737. (Footnote omitted)
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has begun to be generated in the area of mental health law.6 In substan-
tiating its holding, the scant case law addressing the issue of the standard of
proof in commitment procedure was put to little use by the court.7 Rather,
the court wholly relied on a broader base of precedent by utilizing an analysis
which placed involuntary civil commitment beside comparable situations
found in recent due process cases considered by the Supreme Court.
In re Winship8 held that a juvenile, charged in a juvenile proceeding with
an act that would constitute a crime if committed by an adult, must be af-
forded a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as one of the essen-
tials of due process. Underlying Winship is the concept that when indi-
vidual liberty is at stake, procedural safeguards must duly reflect and pro-
vide for this immense concern unless weightier interests work to qualify this
general principle. A more recent case, Morrissey v. Brewer,9 addressed the
issue of whether due process applies to a revocation of parole, and if so, what
procedural safeguards must be followed. The Supreme Court held that,
at minimum, due process requires that the revocation procedure afford a
prompt preliminary hearing to determine if reasonable ground exists, as well
as a more formal revocation hearing prior to a final decision by the parole
board. 10 Morrissey reaffirmed the rule in Winship and tailored it to provide
for certain procedural guarantees in a situation where, unlike the complete
freedom held by the juvenile facing charges, the form of liberty jeopardized
is already restricted to a considerable degree by the conditions of parole
imposed on the parolee. Both Winship and Morrissey were to represent a
compelling line of authority for the circuit court's resolution of the jury
instruction issue in involuntary civil commitment.
The Circuit Court's Analysis
The court proposed that given the nature of the personal interests at stake
6. See Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (first to recognize a right
to treatment for an involuntary committed person); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded
Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (the state's mentally
retarded children must be afforded access to public educational programs).
7. The court merely referred to the handfull of cases, all of which are in accord,
in a footnote. See Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972) appeal
docketed, No. 73-568, 42 U.S.L.W. 3277 (U.S. Sept. 28, 1973); In re Pickles Petition,
170 So.2d 603 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965); Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky.
1964); and Ex parte Perry, 43 A.2d 885 (N.J. 1945). The Lessard case presents a
due process challenge to the entire Wisconsin statutory scheme relating to involuntary
civil commitment, including the requisite burden of proof. However it also contains
threshold procedural issues which could entail disposal of the case without reaching
the merits.
8. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
9. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
10. Furthermore, the revocation hearing must afford the parolee written notice of
the allegations, disclosure of the adverse evidence, opportunity to be heard, a general
right to cross-examination, a "neutral and detached" hearing body and a written state-
ment of reasons for decision. 408 U.S. at 489.
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here, the indefinite deprivation of liberty," privacy, and loss of significant
civil rights,12 there could be no doubt that they were clearly within the purview
of the "liberty and property" language of the due process clause.13 The court
was therefore compelled to turn to an analysis of the competing interests
underlying civil commitment to discern if any of these might work to prevent
the extension of the due process right to commitment procedure.
Examination of the applicable statute14 suggested two entirely distinct
state interests to the court. The primary objective, the state's concern with
antisocial behavior, lent itself to analogy with the criminal system not only
with respect to a similar goal,
. . . but primarily because the resulting restriction of liberty has
assumed a significant and visible role in the creation of inhibitions
to the state's overzealous or mistaken application of that power.'"
The second interest derives from the state's role as parens patriae. Al-
though the court found this objective a viscerally more persuasive rationale
to counterbalance the mentally ill person's loss of liberty, upon closer scru-
tiny the argument lacked foundation. 16 This was chiefly because the legis-
lation itself undercut this apparent justification by drawing no distinction
between statutory standards allowing institutionalization where the individ-
ual poses a threat to society, and where the danger is to the individual him-
self.'
7
11. 21 D.C. CODE ANN. § 545(b), eupra note 2, allows the court to order hospitaliza-
tion for an indeterminate period.
12. The court's opinion observes that:
• . . [W]hile the commitment stands on the record, the party may face state
constitutional and statutory restrictions on his voting rights; restrictions on his
right to serve on a federal jury; restrictions on his ability to obtain a drivers li-
cense; and limitations on his access to a gun license. 482 F.2d at 651-52 (foot-
notes omitted).
See, Omo CONST. art. v, § 6 and N. CAR. STAT., ch. 163, § 56 (1972) (voting right);
28 U.S.C. § 1865(b) (1970) (disqualification for jury service); VA. CODE § 46.1-360
(1950) (automobile operator license); and 22 D.C. CODE §§ 3207, 3210(3)(a) (1967)
(gun license).
13. The court made no distinction between the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth Amendment applies to the District of Colum-
bia.
14. 21 D.C. CODE ANN. § 545 (1973) set out in note 2.
15. 482 F.2d at 650.
16. In this context it might be noted that:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the Government's purposes are beneficient. Men born to freedom are na-
turally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The
greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,
well-meaning but without understanding. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, a 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17. 21 D.C. CODE ANN. § 545 (1973), set out at note 2, is in accord with all those
states which provide for alternative statutory grounds for hospitalization in as much as
none have procedures that differ according to the reason for commitment. See Note,
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In analyzing the standard of proof itself, the court observed that the
preponderance of the evidence standard is usually applied to litigation where
the stakes are often economic,18 while a more stringent standard is fre-
quently imposed where societal interests are pitted against restrictions on
the individual's liberty. 19 Close examination of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard revealed to the court several characteristics favoring its use
in involuntary civil commitment proceedings. In the application of criminal
law, Winship had acknowledged that a society treasuring the value of per-
sonal freedom has a significant interest in assuring the accuracy of the
grounds for its deprivation. 20  The rationale behind this acknowledgment,
society's need to promote confidence in the workings of its legal system, is
equally applicable to civil commitment. Furthermore, just as Winship had
noted with respect to juvenile proceedings,2 1 the court found that imposition
of a greater standard of proof is unlikely to produce any discernible effect
on the commitment procedure itself since it is already similar to a criminal
trial.22 Nor can it work to increase any trauma already suffered by the al-
leged mentally ill individual as a result of the general adversary character of
the proceeding. 23 Also relevant to an analysis of the standard of proof here
is the fact that the very nature of the evidence offered in commitment pro-
ceedings can often be characterized as less than sufficiently accurate. 24 The
more rigorous, "beyond a reasonable doubt standard" is, of course, par-
ticularly suited to mitigate this danger by increasing the degree to which
the jury must be convinced of factual assertions.
The court's opinion embraced Morrissey as offering both a proper frame-
work of due process analysis, and as a gauge against which the strength of
the state interest involved in civil commitment proceedings could be meas-
Civil Commitment of the Mentally ill: Theories and Practices, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1288
(1966).
18. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, at 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
19. See, Woodby v. Immigration Service, 385 U.S. 276 (1966) and Chaunt v. United
States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
20. 397 U.S. at 363-64.
21. Id. at 365-66.
22. 21 D.C. CODE ANN. § 543 (1973) mandates that the alleged mentally ill person is
to be represented by counsel whether or not he so desires, and 21 D.C. CoDE ANN. § 544
(1973) gives him the right to demand a jury trial.
23. Some medical experts are of the opinion that merely being subjected to a hear-
ing is a traumatic experience that may aggravate the condition of certain mental ill-
nesses. See, e.g., Bowman, Presidential Address, 103 AM. J. PSYcHIATRY 1, at 12
(1946).
24. "The only certain thing that can be said about the present state of knowledge
and therapy regarding mental disease is that science has not realized finality of judge-
ment ...... Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956). See also Liv-
ermore, Malmquist & Meehl, On the lustifications for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 75, 80 (1968) and Comment, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards
for Involuntary Civil Commitment and Release, 34 U. CH. L. Rnv. 633, 638-39 (1967).
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sured. In distinguishing the commitment situation from that in parole revoca-
tion, the court observed a proportionate reduction in the magnitude of the
state interest underlying the instant case. A parolee has already been found
beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed specific anti-social acts. The
state then has an "overwhelming" interest in being able to re-imprison without
the burden of a new adversary criminal trial if, in fact, parole has been vio-
lated. 25 The alleged mentally ill person on the other hand, confronts a judicial
determination of his status for the first time. Thus the state does not face the
burden of a new adversary trial, or any repetition of effort for that matter.
Running throughout the court's opinion is a recognition of the realities
of involuntary hospitalization. For example, the court acknowledges that
only when institutionalization actually offers some form of therapy can the
state's role as parens patriae begin to have any meaning.2 6 Later, the
court goes even further by questioning whether the therapy rationale can
ever really alter the essentially punitive nature of any forced deprivation of
liberty. 27 In its analysis the court fails to find any
. . . individual interest which distinguishes civil commitment from
incarceration sufficiently to justify assuming a greater risk of
wrongful deprivation in the latter.
28
This reinforces the court's earlier determination that, as in the criminal sys-
tem, the dominant objective in civil commitment is apparently the protec-
tion of society rather than a primary concern with the well-being of the men-
tally ill individual. Regardless of the civil characterization of commitment
procedure, a successful prosecution can accomplish the same substantive re-
sult, a deprivation of liberty, as a criminal trial can. But the criminal de-
fendant is tried within a legal scheme which affords him the most stringent
standard of proof as well as a determinate statutory sentence. He also has
the benefit of knowing what types of conduct may lead to imprisonment.
The committed civil patient, however, may be indeterminately confined and
for conduct which he may never have realized as statutorily proscribed.
Given the similarity of interests at stake, the court found it quite difficult
to reconcile that on one hand legislatures and courts have continually in-
25. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972).
26. 482 F.2d 659.
27. The court's opinion quotes the observations of a commentator in the criminal
field:
Measures which subject individuals to the substantial and involuntary depriva-
tion of their liberty are essentially punitive in character, and this reality is
not altered by the facts that the motivations that prompt incarceration are to
provide therapy or otherwise contribute to the person's well-being or reform.
Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50 J. CalM.
L.C. & P.S. 226, 230 (1959). Id. at 667.
28. 482 F.2d 667.
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serted procedural safeguards into the criminal system, while leaving the pro-
tections afforded the civilly committed individual at a minimum.2 9 In this
context the significance of the Winship and Morrissey decisions were of
most value in offering support for the court's holding.
Like Winship, the underlying foundation of Morrissey rests on our soci-
ety's abhorrence of error in the factfinding process when individual liberty,
even that which is already limited by parole conditions, is placed in jeopardy.
It therefore follows that when the maximum liberty afforded by the Con-
stitution is being threatened through commitment, the situation of the al-
leged mentally ill individual stands as a much more convincing one than that
of the parolee facing revocation of parole.30 The court also could not help
but conclude that the loss of liberty for the committed civil patient is at least
as great as that for the juvenile delinquent.3 1 Unlike the juvenile in Winship,
the committed individual faces the stigma of a public hearing, an in-
definite period of confinement, and the loss of substantial civil rights. In
Winship, the Supreme Court found that although the consequences of being
adjudged a juvenile delinquent were not the same as being adjudged a crim-
inal, the differences were insufficient to justify a distinction in the standard
of proof.3 2 Since the alleged mentally ill person has at stake interests of
proportional value to that of the charged juvenile, the circuit court was com-
pelled to rule that he too must be afforded a standard of proof commensurate
with the nature of these interests.
Conclusion
One commentator has observed that, in general, civil commitment, estab-
lished in an era when diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill were little
understood, remains today a basically obsolete and unjust process. 8  In
holding proof beyond a reasonable doubt to be the required standard for
forced civil commitment, the court has done much to bring commitment pro-
cedure in line with contemporary notions of justice. Certainly with the
right of liberty involved, a reasonable doubt as to either the mental illness
of an individual, or the harmful consequences of it should be resolved in the
individual's favor when forceful commitment is sought. An insufficiently
warranted, or perhaps outright mistaken, deprivation of personal liberty can
no less be excused when done through the workings of the civil commit-
29. Id. at 658.
30. Id. at 656.
31. Id. at 669.
32. 397 U.S. at 365-366.
33. Kutner, The Illusion of Due Process in Commitment Procedure, 57 NORTH-
wVsmxN U.L REV. 383 (1962).
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ment scheme than when accomplished by the criminal system. Behind ev-
ery deprivation of freedom, whether criminal or civil, there should exist pro-
cedural safeguards which reflect our society's traditional emphasis on the
critical importance of personal liberty. To afford less than this in the in-
voluntary commitment situation would be to carve out an unrealistic excep-
tion to judicially recognized principles of due process of law.
Kenneth Appel
MILITARY LAW-On Collateral Attack of Court Martial Judg-
ments, Civilian Courts May Determine Whether Defendant Was
Prejudiced By Joinder of Illegal Charge. Levy v. Parker, 478
F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court has often decided cases involving the jurisdictional limits
of court martials over military and non-military personnel. It has also
found it necessary in the past to weigh military necessity as a justification
for government action that infringes upon private prerogatives. But since the
Constitution has delegated power to Congress to provide for the discipline
of the armed forces, the federal courts have been understandably reluctant
to play an active role in setting constitutional standards on military disci-
pline. They have been even more reluctant to do so where they would be
required to examine evidence to adjudicate the constitutional issues.
Captain Howard Levy was convicted by an Army court-martial on three
counts.1 The charges stemmed from his refusal to obey an order to estab-
lish and operate a training program for Special Forces Aidmen in dermatol-
ogy and from statements made by Levy to an enlisted man attacking the war
in Vietnam and the Special Forces and implying that black soldiers should
refuse to fight in Vietnam. Levy was sentenced under all three counts, ex-
hausted his appeals within the military justice system and petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus. He argued that his statements were protected speech
1. The charges were brought under the following articles of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice: Article 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890(2) (1970) (willfully disobeying su-
perior commissioned officer); Article 133, 10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970) (conduct unbecom-
ing an officer and a gentleman); and Article 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970) (disorders
and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline).
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under the first amendment and that training Special Forces Aidmen would
be a war crime and violation of his medical ethics.
Rejecting Levy's arguments, the third circuit nevertheless found two of
the three articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice under which Levy
was convicted to be overbroad, vague and void on their face.2 However,
the court decided not to apply the usual rule in reviewing criminal cases
that a sentence imposed on multiple convictions will be upheld on appeal
if any of the convictions are valid and would legally support the sentence
imposed. 3 The court of appeals ordered the writ to issue unless the military
provided a new trial on the one valid charge, refusal to obey a lawful or-
der.4
While the substantive constitutional and legal claims of Captain Levy are
of interest and importance, this note will examine Levy in light of the pre-
ceding standards for determining how closely civilian courts, on collateral
review, may examine the factual record and play an active role in redressing
the legal rights of men in uniform convicted by courts-martial.
The "Fully and Fairly" Test
Article 76 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 5 makes court-martial
judgments binding upon all courts of the United States. While it is widely
agreed that this precludes direct appellate review of court-martial judg-
ments,6 there has been a wide divergence of judicial opinion on the scope
of collateral review of these judgments. 7
Traditionally, the approach used in collateral attacks on court-martial
judgments and state criminal convictions was that the federal courts were
limited to a determination of whether the court-martial or state court had
jurisdiction." As recently as 1950, the Supreme Court noted in Hiatt v.
2. These were Articles 133 and 134. 10 U.S.C. §§ 933-34 (1970).
3. Claasen v. United States, 142 U.S. 140 (1891).
4. Chief Judge Seitz filed a separate opinion, concurring in the holding that Arti-
cles 133 and 134 are overbroad and vague on their face, but dissenting from the find-
ing that Captain Levy was prejudiced in his trial on the Article 90 charge by the
joinder of charges under the invalid articles.
5. 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
6. See, e.g., Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864), where the
Court refused to hear a claim that a court-martial was without jurisdiction over the
accused and that freedom of speech of the accused was violated. The case was
brought on direct appeal. This is still good law. Shaw v. United States, 209 F.2d
811 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
7.. See Note, Civilian Court Review of Court Martial Adjudications, 69 COLUM. L.
REv. 1259 (1969).
8. The following cases illustrate the types of jurisdictional issues decided under
the traditional view: McClaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 (1902) (whether court-mar-
tial was legally convened and constituted); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65,
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Brown,9 "It is well settled that 'by habeas corpus the civil courts exercise
no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial.
• . . The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.'"
The same year that Hiatt was handed down, the Supreme Court began
cautiously to expand the scope of collateral review. In Whelchel v. McDon-
ald,10 the Court stated that denial of an opportunity to present a defense
such as insanity would go to a question of jurisdiction; nevertheless, the
expansion was not without restriction for it was held that any error commit-
ted in evaluating the evidence was beyond the reach of civil court review.
And in Gusik v. Schilder" the Court interpreted what is today Article 76 of
the U.C.M.J. as not depriving civil courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction.
Three years after Hiatt, in Burns v. Wilson,1 Chief Justice Vinson laid
down the test that still remains in effect, even though there was no majority
opinion.' 3  The Chief Justice stated that Article 76 of the U.C.M.J. meant
that "when a military decision has dealt fully and fairly with an allegation
raised in that [habeas corpus] application, it is not open to a federal civil
court to grant the writ simply to re-evaluate the evidence."' 4  However,
Vinson also stressed the responsibility of the habeas corpus court to take
into account the fairness of the prior proceedings. "The military courts,
like the state courts, have the same responsibilities as do federal courts to
protect a person from violation of his constitutional rights."' 5
Justice Minton's concurring opinion approved of the Hiatt standard as
the measure of how closely a civil court could examine the proceedings of
a court-martial under collateral review. Vinson argued that military law is
a separate jurisprudence over which civil courts could exercise no super-
visory role. At least for this proposition, it would appear that the Chief
81 (1857) (jurisdiction over the subject matter); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2
(1866) and Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 21-22 (1879) (jurisdiction over the person);
Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 381-82 (1902) (whether sentence was within sta-
tutory limits); Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887) and Dynes v. Hoover,
supra (whether court martial procedure conformed to statutes and regulations of juris-
dictional nature).
9. 339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950), quoting In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890).
The Hiatt Court did not seem concerned with the several fundamental errors found
by the Court of Appeals which also found that the law member of the court-martial,
the defense counsel and the reviewing authorities were grossly incompetent. 175 F.2d
273, 277 (5th Cir. 1949).
10. 340 U.S. 122, 124 (1950).
11. 340 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1950).
12. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
13. Vinson's opinion was joined in by Justices Reed, Burton and Clark. Justice
Jackson concurred in the result but did not file any opinion. Black and Douglas dis-
sented because they felt the petitioners were entitled to a judicial hearing on their
claims. Frankfurters' two opinions are discussed below.




Justice had a majority behind him. Both Vinson and Minton felt that the
framers of the Constitution had left to Congress the task of balancing con-
stitutional rights against military necessity and that Congress accomplished
this task by enacting the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Vinson viewed
the Code as a major reform of the whole field of military justice, promising
a better chance for servicemen to get a fair hearing on their constitutional
claims within the military system.
Despite the broadening of the traditional areas of review from the juris-
dictional issues under Hiatt to a consideration of whether the military system
had dealt "fully and fairly" with the constitutional claims under Burns, the
federal courts did not issue one writ of habeas corpus on other than juris-
dictional grounds to a military petitioner until 1965.11 According to former
Chief Justice Warren, this hardening of judicial attitude was not so much
a result of the Burns decision as it was a recognition by the civilian judi-
ciary that it did not have a large role in regulating the military's treatment
of its own personnel.
17
One of the earliest decisions in 1965 that granted habeas corpus relief
to a military petitioner on non-jurisdictional grounds was Application of
Stapely.'8 The district court, ostensibly uninhibited by precedent, delved
into factual matters that could have been reviewed by the military authori-
ties. The court seemed to view the restrictions in Burns not so much as in-
hibiting its power to examine factual issues as posing a limitation of the
scope of its review to constitutional issues.
The Court of Claims' 9 seems to have taken the opposite approach. In
16. Note, Civilian Court Review of Court Martial Adjudications, 69 COLUM. L. REv.
1259, 1265 (1969).
17. Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REy. 181, 187
(1962):
[ . . Lit is indisputable that the tradition of our country, from the Revolu-
tion until now, has supported the military establishment's broad power to
deal with its own personnel. The most obvious reason is that courts are ill-
equipped to determine the impact upon disicpline that any particular intru-
sion upon military authority might have.
Warren felt that although the various opinions in Burns were "not as clear as they
might be," they nonetheless stood for the proposition when read as a whole that "our
citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed
their civilian clothes." Id. at 188. According to Warren, the deference to military
authority was also a result of the establishment of the Court of Military Appeals as
a civilian "Supreme Court" of the military.
18. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965). One of the main grounds of the decision was
the incompetency of defense counsel in the military proceeding. This was the same
grounds found unsatisfactory in Hiatt. See note 9 supra.
19. Habeas corpus is an effective form of collateral relief since it will secure a
prisoner's release. However, there are other forms of collateral relief available. The
scope of review is the same. See Edward F. Sherman, Judicial Review of Military
Determinations and the Exhaustion of Remedies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483
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Shaw v. United States,20 the court reasoned that while issues of fact might
be placed beyond the scope of collateral review by Burns, pure issues of
constitutional law were to be decided by the civilian court.
The Supreme Court set out to examine the jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims to review court-martial judgments in United States v. Augenblick
and United States v. Juhl, decided together in one opinion in 1969.21 The
Supreme Court reversed on substantive grounds the decisions of the Court
of Claims to grant collateral relief. Although the Court did not clear up
the basic jurisdictional issue, it did make it clear that collateral relief could
not be extended by civilian courts to military petitioners on statutory grounds
unless the legitimate claims for relief rose to a constitutional level.
The "Fully and Fairly" Test Applied in Levy
In holding two articles of the U.C.M.J. too vague to withstand constitu-
tional attack, the Levy court did not have to violate the literal requirements
laid down in Burns. Whether or not the military authorities dealt fully and
fairly with the constitutional issue, the third circuit did not grant the writ
simply to re-evaluate the evidence. However, the decision does indicate a
willingness on the part of the court to exercise an active role in fashioning
standards for military justice. This can be seen by the court's exercise of
its discretion to grant the writ despite the fact that it found one of the three
convictions to be valid and legally sufficient to support the sentence.
The rule usually applied to review of criminal convictions in federal
courts is that where a single sentence is imposed upon convictions on sev-
eral charges, "that . . . sentence will be upheld on appeal if any one of the
convictions is valid, and the sentence imposed is within the statutorily au-
thorized maximum for the valid conviction, despite the fact that convic-
tions on the other charges may not be valid. '" 22  The Levy court relied
upon the Supreme Court decision in Benton v. Maryland23 when it reasoned
that this rule is discretionary with the reviewing court. However, Benton
was decided by the Supreme Court on a direct appeal from the Maryland
courts. If discretion is to be exercised on appeal, it is dificult to under-
stand why the court sitting on collateral review should exercise it rather than
(1969). See also Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966) (action in Court
of Claims for back pay) and Smith v. McNamara, 395 F.2d 896 (10th Cir. 1968) (suit
for writ of mandamus to require the Secretary of Defense to remove dishonorable dis-
charge from department records).
20. 357 F.2d 949 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
21. 393 U.S. 348 (1969).
22. 478 F.2d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 1973).
23. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
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the military authorities who are the only authorities empowered by statute
to review the case on direct appeal.
To issue the writ, the Levy court had to find that the joinder of the un-
constitutional charges with the valid charge of refusing to obey an order
prejudiced a fair trial on the valid charge. In doing so, the court analyzed
the defense strategy and the likelihood that military judges would be preju-
diced by Levy's political views which came out in the court-martial as a result
of the joinder of the invalid charges. 24  In deciding it had jurisdiction,the
court reasoned that it was unnecessary to evaluate the evidence since the
attack on two of the Articles of the Code was not dependent on evidentiary
or factual construction, and that the decision to review the case was thus well
within the approach of the Court of Claims outlined in Shaw. The extent
to which the court went into the factual record belies this claim.
The majority in Levy also stated that the two articles declared by the
court to be void on their face rarely stand alone as a basis for prosecution,
and that the "general sentence rule would virtually insulate these articles
from constitutional scrutiny."'25 Not only does the majority fail to indicate
the basis of its presumption that the articles in question rarely stand alone,
but it seems to be much more interested in examining the articles than in
simply vindicating the rights of the habeas corpus petitioner in question.
The Levy case represents a situation somewhere between a collateral
attack such as in Shaw where the civilian court examined only purely non-
factual issues of constitutional law and a case such as Burns where the
lower courts issued the writ to reexamine issues of fact that were necessary
to decide the constitutional issue, but which had already been ruled on by
the military authorities. If the Supreme Court reviews the case, it should
clarify the standards laid down in Burns. It should also examine the under-
lying premises of the Burns decision, especially since the scope of collateral
review in examining state criminal convictions has been greatly expanded
since Burns was decided.
The "Fully and Fairly" Test Re-examined
Two important developments in Supreme Court case law have occurred
since 1953 that might make the test laid down in Burns out of date.
24. The Levy majority acknowledged that Levy revealed his political views in the
cross-examination of Colonel Fancy, when his attorneys tried to show an illegal motive
behind Fancy's order to Levy. However, Levy's attorneys had asked for a severance
which was denied. The Court refused to speculate how the defense might have been
conducted had the severance been granted. 478 F.2d at 798-99.
25. Id. at 779 n.4.
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The first lies in the expansion of the power and obligation of federal courts
to look into factual matters on habeas corpus review of state criminal con-
victions heralded by Fay v. Noia26 and Townsend v. Sain.2 7 The second
lies in the closer scrutiny given military jurisdiction in O'Callahan v. Parker.
28
In Townsend v. Sain, the Court stated, "It is the typical, not the rare,
case in which constitutional claims turn upon the resolution of contested
factual issues."' 29 The Court recognized that the writ of habeas corpus was
an opportunity to redress detention in violation of the Constitution which
presupposes an opportunity to be heard, to argue and present evidence.
The Court held that even where state courts have held full and fair factual
hearings, the district courts have discretion to conduct their own factual hear-
ings and find the facts for themselves. Considerations of comity certainly
play as great a role in reviewing state court judgments as judgments of a
military court-martial. It is, therefore, hard to understand why federal courts
should be forced to don blinders when examining court-martial judgments
on collateral attack, as the law-fact approach of the Court of Claims would
seem to require.
In O'Callahan v. Parker, the Supreme Court held that in order for a military
tribunal to have jurisdiction over an offense, it must be service-related, even
if it is committed by a serviceman. Determining exactly what offenses are
service-related involves an examination of the needs of the military in punish-
ing the particular offense. Although the Court has often enunciated "...
the basic principles of comity that must prevail between civilian courts and
the military justice system... ,,,30 the holding tends to undercut the rationale
of restricting federal courts to pure issues of law on collateral review, since the
basis of that rationale has been that military tribunals and not federal courts
should weigh the needs of military discipline.3 '
In light of all that has happened since Burns, the views expressed by
Justice Frankfurter in two separate opinions filed in that case take on added
significance: 
32
The right to invoke habeas corpus to secure freedom is not to
be confined by any a priori or technical notions of 'jurisdiction'.
• . . And so, if imprisonment is the result of a denial of due proc-
ess, it may be challenged no matter under what authority of Gov-
26. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
27. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
28. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
29. 372 U.S. at 312.
30. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 46 (1972).
31. See Warren, supra note 17.
32. 346 U.S. at 148-49 (citation omitted).
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ernment it was brought about. Congress itself in the exercise of
its war power 'is subject to applicable constitutional limitations.'
Frankfurter analyzed the implied restrictions in Burns in light of previous
decisions3 3 to go beyond consideration of technical jurisdiction when col-
laterally reviewing federal criminal convictions. "If a denial of due process
deprives a civil body of 'jurisdiction', is not a military body equally without
'jurisdiction' when it makes such a denial, whatever the requirements of due
process in the particular circumstances may be?"
'8 4
All of this does little to calm the fears of the military that discipline will
be undermined if a recruit can make a federal case out of any attempt by
the military to discipline him. However, Frankfurter offered a solution when
he suggested that different standards will necessarily have to apply in a mili-
tary context in order to take the needs of the military into consideration:
5
But there is no table of weights and measures for ascertaining
what constitutes due process. Indeed, it was common ground,
in the majority and dissenting opinions below, that due process
• . . is not 'the same in a military setting as it is in a civil setting.'
The federal courts will have to develop new standards to apply to constitu-
tional questions in a military situation. The scope of constitutional rights
is necessarily more limited in the military where clear danger is ever pres-
ent. But this does not mean that servicemen need be denied the oppor-
tunity to make the best case they can, addressing themselves to facts and
law, once they appeal to the federal courts.
Conclusion
The third circuit did not violate any of the literal terms of the Burns test
in remanding Levy's case for a new trial on the one valid charge against him.
Even though the majority opinion claimed that it did not have to go beyond
pure issues of constitutional law in reviewing the case, the Levy court did
have to probe deeply into factual matters in order to determine whether
the joinder of invalid charges prejudiced the right of Captain Levy to a fair
trial on the valid charge. This goes beyond the approach of the Court of
Claims to leave all questions of fact for the military. Moreover, the opin-
ion indicates much more of a willingness to play an active role in protecting
the constitutional rights of servicemen than what is indicated in the Burns de-
cision.
33. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (failure of federal court to provide
counsel held to be jurisdictional error).
34. 346 U.S. at 848.
35. Id. at 149.
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Should the Supreme Court review the case,86 it should clarify the standards
outlined in the Burns opinion to free federal courts from any inhibition ex-
pressed in Burns against developing the facts fully when necessary to decide
the constitutional issue, especially where the facts were not developed in
the military proceedings. Constitutional rights cannot be adjudicated on the
basis of whether a petitioner is lucky enough to have his case turn on purely
legal issues without any factual disputes. The preservation of military dis-
cipline lies not in any artificial test of what courts may or may not look at
when examining a military case. It lies in the exercise of restraint by fed-
eral courts in applying constitutional rights to a military situation.
Robert H. Bear
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Sixth Amendment Does Not Guar-
antee Right to Counsel at Pre-Trial Photo-Identification-United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) Distinguished. United
States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
In 1932, the Supreme Court declared in Powell v. Alabama1 that the de-
fendent in a criminal prosecution "requires the guiding hand of counsel
at every step of the proceedings against him." 2 Since that time, the Court
has sustained the sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel3 at
steps in the prosecution which present the same dangers that would confront
an uncounseled defendant at trial.4 The question of whether a pre-trial
photographic identification poses this threat to the defendant was answered
by the Court in United States v. Ash.5
Respondent Ash and a co-defendant were indicted for robbery. During
a two-year period between indictment and trial, the Government did not ar-
36. Probable jurisdiction noted and held in abeyance for hearing on other issues, 42
U.S.L.W. 3246 (Oct. 23, 1973).
1. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2. Id. at 69.
3. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have
the assistance of counsel in his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973).
5. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
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range a lineup to confirm Ash's identity. Instead, less than 24 hours before
trial, an FBI agent, accompanied by the prosecutor, showed five color photo-
graphs to four eye witnesses, three of whom identified Ash. At trial, only one
of these three made a "positive" identification. Both the fact that three wit-
nesses had previously identified respondent from the color photographs and
the photographs themselves were admitted into evidence. The Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, sitting en banc, held 5-4 that Ash's
constitutional right to counsel had been violated by the uncounseled display of
photographs. 6
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Blackmun, emphasized
that Ash was not physically present when identified from the photographs
and thus was not subjected to a "trial-like confrontation" with the prosecu-
tion. The majority held that "the Sixth Amendment does not grant the
right to counsel at photographic displays conducted by the Government for
the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an identification of the of-
fender."
7
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan maintained that inherent in
a pre-trial identification by photograph are dangers which threaten the de-
fendant's right to a fair trial on the issue of identity. Brennan concluded,
therefore, that the sixth amendment does grant to the defendant the right
of having his counsel present at this step in the prosecution.8 How this
sharp division could arise, in light of past decisions of the Court on the right
to counsel and particularly in light of United States v. Wade9, in which the
Court held that a defendant has the right to counsel at a pre-trial lineup, is
the subject of this Note.
The Evolution of the "Critical Stage"
The real significance of Powell v. Alabama has emerged only recently. 10
In Hamilton v. Alabama" the Supreme Court, for the first time, character-
ized an encounter between a defendant and the Government as a "critical
stage" of the prosecution. The issue in this case was whether the arraign-
ment of an uncounseled defendant violated the sixth amendment guarantee
of the right to counsel. Noting that in Alabama a defendant is required to
raise defenses and enter pleadings at the time of arraignment, the Court
6. 461 F.2d 92, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
7. 413 U.S. at 321.
8. Id. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
10. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court reaffirmed Powell
in holding that the right to counsel could not be limited by a state statute which
required appointment of counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases only.
11. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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stated that arraignment is a "critical stage in a criminal proceeding. What
happens there may affect the whole trial." 12  Thus, the Court held that the
sixth amendment guarantees the right to counsel in this situation, for it is
only the presence of his counsel that enables the accused to make informed
and prudent choices as to the defenses he will raise, and the pleadings he will
enter.13
A more recent decision of the Court, Coleman v. Alabama,14 held that
the right to counsel arises at a preliminary hearing. The determination that
the hearing was a "critical stage," was based on an analysis of "whether
potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the . . . con-
frontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice."'" The
Court concluded that the presence of counsel at the preliminary hearing
is essential to protect the accused from a prosecution which in some or
all respects lacks foundation, and to discover the full case against the ac-
cused, so that thorough trial preparation can be made.16
In holding that the right to counsel arises at a police interrogation of a
suspect in custody, the Court in Miranda v. Arrizona 7 found it unnecessary to
determine whether such a situation was a "critical stage" of the prosecution.
The right to counsel is guaranteed because, in the Court's view, the absence
of counsel at a custodial interrogation undermines the defendant's fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination'8 by making it possible for the
police to elicit a pre-trial confession and reduce the defendant's trial to a
mere formality. 19
At the outset of its opinion in United States v. Wade, the Court stated
that compulsory participation in a lineup does not violate a defendant's
12. Id. at 54.
13. Id. at 55. The Court has also held that a preliminary hearing at which the
defendant is merely given an opportunity to plead, though under the law of the state
there is no requirement that he do so, is a "critical stage" of the prosecution. White
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
14. 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
15. Id. at 9, quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.
16. 399 U.S. at 9.
17. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Id. at 466.
19. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 487 (1964), quoting In re Groban, 352
U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting). Prior to Escobedo and Miranda, the
Court held that incriminating statements made by a defendant who was not yet in
custody, but who had been indicted, should have been excluded from evidence at trial
since it appeared that they were overheard by federal agents who, without notice to
the defendant's lawyer, had arranged a meeting between the defendant and an accom-
plice turned informant. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). Here also,
the Court did not rely on the "critical stage" analysis, but primarily upon the attempt
by police to elicit an incriminating statement directly from the defendant.
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fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 20  The Court turned its
attention instead to the danger that, when an uncounseled defendant is com-
pelled to participate in a lineup, his "most basic right as a criminal defendant
-his right to a fair trial at which the witnesses against him might be mean-
ingfully cross-examined,"' 21 will be irretrievably lost. The Court discussed
at length what it regarded as the high potential for prejudice to the defend-
ant which is inherent in a pre-trail lineup and the difficulty of demonstrating
the prejudicial character of a lineup to the judge and jury at trial.22  It
acknowledged that cross-examination at trial of the witnesses who attended
the lineup can be utilized by the defense to challenge the credibility of the
identification or uncover sources of prejudice, but added that "the first line
of defense must be the prevention of unfairness . . . at the lineup itself."
' 23
The Court reasoned that, since there is significant potential for prejudice
in a pre-trial lineup which may be impossible for the defense to reconstruct
at trial, and since the presence of counsel would tend to minimize such preju-
dice and thereby enhance the defendant's right to a " meaningful confronta-
tion at trial," a lineup is a "critical stage" of the prosecution at which the
right to counsel is no less warranted that it is at the trial itself.
2 4
In Gilbert v. California,2 5 which was decided on the same day as Wade,
the Court gave effect to its characterization of a lineup as a "critical stage."
It held that the admission into evidence of in-court identifications of an
accused without a prior determination that they were independent of identi-
fications made at an uncounseled and therefore illegal lineup, was constitu-
tional error.2 6  In a third case decided that day, Stovall v. Denno,27 the
20. 388 U.S. at 221. Four justices dissented from this part of the majority opinion,
believing that a compulsory lineup does violate a defendant's fifth amendment privi-
lege.
21. Id. at 223-24.
22. The high risk that a lineup will be prejudicial to a defendant is attributable
to such factors as the possibility of mistaken identification, a witness' unwillingness
to admit mistake or his inability even to realize it, and the suggestiveness which is
inherent in the context of a lineup and which may be heightened due to the manner
in which a particular suspect is presented. Reconstructability at trial is essential if
the judge and jury are to weigh the credibility of the identification. But neither the
witnesses nor the defendant himself are apt to be alert for, or trained in the detection
of, conditions which made the lineup prejudicial to the defendant. Cross-examination
of them at trial by counsel who was not himself at the lineup will thus be an inade-
quate means of reconstruction. 388 U.S. at 228-30.
23. Id. at 235.
24. Id. at 236-37, quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 57.
25. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
26. id. at 272. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), limited the right to coun-
sel to pre-trial lineups which occur after indictment. The issues discussed in Kirby
did not arise in the instant case since Ash was already under indictment at the time
the identification was conducted.
27. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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Court acknowledged that an established, alternative ground of attacking a
pre-trial identification is that the circumstances under which it was made
were so prejudicial to the defendant that he was denied due process of law
in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
28
The Court reaffirmed this principle specifically with respect to photo-
graphic identification in Simmons v. United States,29 in which it was held
that a conviction based on an eyewitness identification at trial following a
pre-trial identification by photograph will be set aside only if the pre-trial
identification procedure was so prejudicial to the defendant that it made
likely a misidentification, which the defense would be powerless to undo.
3 0
The Court defended the use of photographs for identification purposes; how-
ever, this defense was made with specific reference to "initial identification,"
not with reference to identification of a defendant in custody and under in-
dictment. Moreover, the right to counsel was not discussed at all since the
defendant, who was still at large at the time of the photographic identifica-
tion, did not assert that he had a right to counsel at that time, but rather that
he had been denied due process of law by virtue of the circumstances under
which the identification was made.31 Thus, the facts and the issue in Sim-
mons are clearly distinguishable from those in Ash and Wade.32
The Approach in the Circuit Courts
Only two years before Wade, the Court of Appeals for the District of Col-
umbia held that a defendant was not denied his constitutional right to counsel
by virtue of his being compelled to participate, without counsel, in a lineup
held shortly after the crime had been committed. 3  The court stressed that
trial testimony based on what transpired at the lineup was evidence "only
of identification," and was not primary evidence of guilt.3 4
Under Wade, this distinction clearly can no longer be made when the
defendant has been identified from a lineup. With respect to photographic
identification on the other hand, the distinction between mere evidence of
identification and primary evidence of guilt persists. The courts have be-
lieved it to be sound policy to make available evidence of a witness' ability
28. Id. at 302, relying on Palmer v. Peyton, 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
29. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
30. Id. at 384.
31. Id. at 383.
32. Indeed, the Simmons opinion cited People v. Evans, 39 Cal. App. 2d 242, 246 P.2d
636 (1952). The issues in that case, as stated by the California court, were "the
insufficiency of the evidence so far as the element of identification is concerned and
prejudicial errors alleged to have occurred during the course of the trial." 246 P.2d
at 637.
33. Williams v. United States, 345 F.2d 733, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
34. Id. at 734,
[Vol. 23:389
Casenotes
or inability to make a pre-trial photographic identification of the defendant,
so that the jury may better judge the credibility of in-court testimony.85
Whether the defendant has been denied his right "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him ' 86 by virtue of the admission of evidence of the
pre-trial identification is a question of much current controversy,3 7 but one
which is not within the scope of this Note. However, the question of wheth-
er the constitutional rule requiring the presence of counsel at a lineup is also
controlling of the admissability of a photographic identification, is the central
issue of Ash.
The circuit courts of appeals, with the exception of the District of Col-
umbia, are all but unanimous 3 8 in the position that Wade does not apply
to photographic identifications which occur after arrest. The Tenth Circuit
assumed this stance in 1968.39 The court stated that pre-trial identification
by photograph is simply a part of the Government's trial preparation, and
stressed that the accused is not confronted by the prosecution when such an
identification technique is employed.
40
In the following year, the Second Circuit concluded that to hold that a
defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel at a stage of the prosecution
which was conducted in his absence "would press the Sixth Amendment be-
yond any previous boundary," and cited the Tenth Circuit's similar view.
41
The court also cited the defense of photographic identification in Simmons,
though it noted that in Simmons the right to counsel was not involved since
the photographs were shown to the witnesses before the defendant had been
taken into custody.
42
More recently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
35. United States v. Roth, 430 F.2d 1137, 1140 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 1021 (1971).
36. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
37. See United States v. Small, 443 F.2d 497, 498-500 (3d Cir. 1971), for a dis-
cussion of this issue.
38. In the first circuit, United States v. Butler, 426 F.2d 1275 (1st Cir. 1970),
held that the in-court identifications were made independently of those made pre-trial
in the absence of counsel, and therefore it was unnecessary to reach the sixth amend-
ment Wade argument. In the seventh circuit, the issue of whether Wade is applicable
to a post-arrest photographic identification has not yet arisen, though it has been held
that under Simmons, evidence of an identification in the absence of counsel but prior
to arrest is admissible at trial. United States v. Robinson, 406 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969).
39. McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S
908 (1969).
40. Id. at 436.
41. United States v. Bennet, 409 F.2d 888, 899, 900 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied
sub nom., Haywood v. United States, 396 U.S. 852 (1969).
42. 409 F.2d at 900.
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overruled United States v. Zeiler,43 an earlier panel decision of that court,
which had held Wade applicable to pre-trial photographic identification.
It was stated in Zeiler that the considerations which warrant the presence of
counsel at a lineup are equally applicable to a photographic identification.
44
In overruling Zeiler,45 the court relied on what is construed in Wade as an
"unabated emphasis" of the sixth amendment's confrontation clause,46 and
declared, "while the constitutional underpinnings [of Wade] relate to the
broader base right of confrontations at trial, the actual mischief sought to
be avoided was the physical confrontation of an uncounseled defendant
with his alleged victim and other witnesses."' 47  The treatment of this issue
in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits is consistent with that
in the three summarized here. 48  The majority view in the state courts also
rejects application of Wade to pre-trial photographic identification.
49
In Ash itself, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia disputed
what it viewed as the limitation which the other circuits placed upon the
sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel. It contended that
this right arises whenever there is a risk that the actions or words of other
persons may result in prejudice to the defendant: that the right is not limited
to situations where the defendant is physically present. That prejudice
may result in one instance from manipulation of the defendant's body, and
in another instance from manipulation only of his photograph, has no bear-
ing on the right to counsel.50 The court emphasized that there is a most
significant distinction between a pre-trial photographic identification of the
defendant and the other meetings which the prosecutor has with the govern-
ment witnesses in preparing for trial. The prosecutor cannot introduce
testimony on his direct examination of a witness, of statements made to
him by that witness at an earlier meeting. However, as the court had
pointed out in a prior decision, the prosecutor may on direct examination
introduce evidence of the witness' prior photographic identification of the
defendant. 51 Moreover, assuming that the identification was not prejudi-
43. 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970).
44. Id. at 1307.
45. United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1972).
46. See note 36 supra.
47. 461 F.2d at 741.
48. United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1025 (1970); United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970); United States
v. Serio, 440 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1971); United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288 (8th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974 (1972); Allen v. Rhay, 431 F.2d 1160 (9th
Cir. 1970).
49. See cases listed in 93 S. Ct. at 2569-70 n.2; 461 F.2d at 99 notes 8 & 10;
461 F.2d at 111-12 notes 20-29.
50. 461 F.2d at 101.
51. United States v. Kirby, 427 F.2d 610, 612 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
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cial to the defendant under the due process standard discussed in Simmons,
and that the witness is available for cross-examination as to his knowledge
of the procedure at the identification, his pre-trial identification by photo-
graph is deemed to have greater probative value than his in-court identifi-
cation of the defendant, since the latter is subject to the suggestiveness
created by the circumstances which necessarily accompany a trial.52 In
light of its independent standing as evidence and the reliability which has
been ascribed to it, to say that a pre-trial photographic identification is
"less than a critical stage of the prosecution is to blink reality."
53
The Qualification of United States v. Wade
In its Ash opinion, the Supreme Court reviewed the brief history of the
sixth amendment guarantee of the right to counsel, and concluded that the
historical test for deciding claims of that right calls for a determination of
whether, in the context in which the claim was made, the defendant required
the aid of counsel in coping with legal procedure or in facing the prosecu-
tor.54 The Court observed that Wade is a prime example of the application
of the historical test. At a lineup the defendant is compelled to face the
prosecutor or a representative of him and is thereby thrust into a "trial-like
confrontation" at which the presence of counsel is required to compensate
for the superior knowledge and experience of the authorities. 55
The dangers of mistaken identification, suggestivity, and lack of recon-
structability mentioned in Wade, and relied upon in United States v. Zeiler
to apply Wade to photographic identification, are not a sufficient basis for
requiring the presence of counsel.5 6 In support of this assertion, the Court
attached great significance to the manner in which the Wade decision dis-
tinguished a lineup from other identification techniques such as fingerprint-
ing or taking blood samples. This distinction was drawn, said the Court,
not in terms of the need for counsel to protect the defendant's rights at the
time such techniques are employed, for the Wade opinion had already con-
cluded that a lineup constituted a "trial-like confrontation" and therefore the
presence of counsel. Rather, the Wade Court drew this distinction in terms
of reconstructability at trial, and only in response to the government's argu-
ment that if the right to counsel arises at a lineup it arises also at other
steps in the prosecution's evidence gathering. 57 The Ash majority contended
52. Clemons v. United States, 408 F.2d 1230, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 964 (1969).
53. 461 F.2d at 101.
54. 413 U.S. at 314.
55. Id. at 314.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 314-16. In reference to the less than "critical" character of an identifi-
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that the clear implication of this reasoning is that the presence of counsel at the
time of an identification by fingerprints or blood sample is not required as a
matter of right under the sixth amendment but is required, if at all, only be-
cause the identification procedure in question may be difficult to reconstruct at
trial. 8 Reconstructability then, is not a test of whether the defendant has a
right to the presence of counsel, but only of whether the presence of counsel is
necessary in view of the fact that cross-examination at trial may, in the case
of certain identification techniques, be inadequate to check any misuse the
prosecution may make of them. It is a test of whether the presence of
counsel is required to maintain equality in the adversary process. 59
The ultimate construction placed upon Wade, primarily by virtue of the
distinction drawn between a lineup identification and an identification made
from evidence which can be displayed in the absence of the defendant, was
that the Wade Court tacitly acknowledged that the physical presence of the
defendant within the context in which the identification is made is, under
the historical test, determinate of whether the right to counsel arises.6 0
In light of the Court's analysis of Wade, its holding in Ash was quite fore-
seeable. Ash was not present when the witnesses were shown the photo-
graphs. The identification did not constitute a "trial-like adversary con-
frontation" during which the accused might have been "misled by his lack of
familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary," and
thus, the right to counsel did not arise.
6 1
cation based on such evidence as fingerprints, hair, clothing or blood samples, the Court
in Wade explained:
Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is sufficiently avail-
able, and the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has the op-
portunity for a meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at trial
through the ordinary processes of cross-examination of the Government's ex-
pert witnesses and the presentation of the evidence of his own experts. The
denial of a right to have his counsel present at such analyses does not there-
fore violate the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages since there is
minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such stages might derogate from his
right to a fair trial." 388 U.S. at 227-28.
But see 388 U.S. at 236-37, where the Wade opinion stated:
Since it appears that there is grave potential for prejudice ... in the pre-
trial lineup, which may not be capable of reconstruction at trial, and since
presence of counsel itself can often avert prejudice and assure a meaningful
confrontation at trial, there can be little doubt that for Wade the post-
indictment lineup was a critical stage of the prosecution . . . . (footnote
omitted; emphasis added).
58. 413 U.S. at 316.
59. Id. at 317.
60. Id. at 316. The Court also mentioned the consistent use of the word "confron-
tations" in Wade as additional evidence that the decision was intended to apply only
to an identification of the defendant made in his presence. Id. at 315-16 n.9.
61. Id. at 317. The Court believed that the alternative rationale for requiring the
presence of counsel, protection of the adversary process, failed here also since equality
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There was a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan who ob-
served that, not withstanding the dangers inherent in a lineup identification
as set out in Wade, the Court has recognized that an identification made
at a lineup is normally more accurate than one made from a display of
photographs.6 2 A misidentification by photograph is equally prejudicial to
the defendant as misidentification at a lineup, in that a witness is more
apt to retain in his memory the image of a photograph than the image of
the person actually seen when the crime took place.63 In another respect,
a photographic identification is potentially more prejudicial to the defendant
since, unlike a lineup, the defendant is not present and cannot himself bring
even the slightest bit of evidence of prejudicial conditions to the attention of
his counsel.
4
The dissent stated that the test which historically has been applied to
claims of the right to counsel is whether, at the stage of the prosecution in
question, the presence of counsel is necessary "to protect the fairness of the
trial itself."'65 It disputed the Court's conclusion that Wade summarily dis-
missed identification from such evidence as fingerprints or blood samples
as less than a "critical stage" of the prosecution because of the physical ab-
sence of the defendant. 6 Rather, the reasoning in Wade was that the sixth
amendment does not require counsel "since there is minimal risk that his
counsel's absence at such stages might derogate from [the defendant's]
right to a fair trial."
67
The issue of reconstructability was not relegated to the role of a second-
ary justification for judicial intervention to protect the adversary process.
It was discussed in Wade because it is descriptive of the threat that a lineup
identification poses to the defendant's right to a fair trial. The distinction
drawn between an identification made at a lineup and an identification
of access to the photographs from which Ash was identified enabled defense counsel
to conduct a similar proceeding in an attempt to discredit the results attained by the
government.
62. 413 U.S. at 332-33 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. at 386 n.6.
63. 413 U.S. at 334-35 (Brennan, J., dissenting), quoting 390 U.S. at 383-84.
64. Id. at 336.
65. Id. at 339, quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 238-39 (1973).
In this case the Court held that the presence of counsel is not required for
there to be an effective waiver of fourth amendment rights, but that it is required
for an effective waiver of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court based its greater concern for the fifth amendment privilege on the need "to pro-
tect the fairness of the trial itself." 412 U.S. at 238-39.
66. The dissent also addressed the Court's reference to the repetition of the word
"confrontations" in Wade, supra note 60, explaining that use of that word was not
significant since Wade involved a lineup which was, of course, a "confrontation."
413 U.S. at 341 n.19.
67. Id. at 343, quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227-28. See note
57 supra.
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made from evidence such as fingerprints, was based on the need to protect
this right, though of course, in discussing this need in reference to a lineup,
is was necessary also to discuss the extent to which such a procedure is re-
constructable at trial.
For the dissent, the essence of Wade is that it provided for the presence
of a trained observer in the person of the defendant's counsel, who, having
witnessed the lineup, would then be able effectively to demonstrate any un-
fairness that occurred at the lineup, and thus preserve the defendant's funda-
mental right to a fair trial, on the issue of identity.68
Conclusion
Among the cases relied on by the Court was Hamilton v. Alabama, in
which, as has already been alluded to in this Note, it was stated that "ar-
raignment is a critical stage in a criminal proceeding. What happens there
may affect the whole trial." One may fairly ask whether Ash represents
a strained interpretation of Hamilton and the cases which followed, includ-
ing Wade. But what is most distressing about Ash is that the Court did not
forthrightly discuss the issue as it was framed in the earlier cases. Under
Ash, the disposition of future claims of the right to counsel at a pre-trial
identification will not turn a determination of how a certain identification
technique or procedure may threaten the defendant's right to a fair trial,
but on a determination merely of whether the defendant's physical pres-
ence is required for the technique to be utilized. 69 This statement may it-
self be a strained interpretation of Ash, but the plausibility of such a future
interpretation is clear.
Joel Cooperrider
68. 413 U.S. at 344.
69. It is in recognition of the realities of modem criminal law enforcement that
the sixth amendment guarantee has been construed in the cases preceding Ash as ap-
plying to "critical stages" of the prosecution. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at
224.
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